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CHOOSING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
Nadia N. Sawicki* 
Abstract: Modern principles of patient autonomy and health care consumerism are at 
odds with medical malpractice law’s traditional skepticism towards the defenses of 
contractual waiver and assumption of risk. Many American courts follow a patient-protective 
view, exemplified by the reasoning in the seminal Tunkl case, rejecting any attempts by 
physicians to relieve themselves of liability on the grounds of a patient’s agreement to 
assume the risk of malpractice. However, where patients pursue unconventional treatments 
that satisfy their personal preferences but that arguably fall outside the standard of care, 
courts have good reason to be more receptive to such defenses. This Article fills an important 
gap in the scholarly debate about whether patients and physicians should be able to modify 
their default duties under tort law, demonstrating that two lines of rarely-acknowledged 
cases—dealing with alternative therapies and Jehovah’s Witness blood refusals—lend 
support to the principle that patients who choose malpractice should be limited in their right 
to tort recovery. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a long-standing debate about whether physicians and patients 
ought to be able to contractually modify their default obligations under 
tort law. One of the core issues in this debate is whether agreements 
purporting to release physicians from liability for malpractice are 
enforceable. Closely related is the issue of whether, in the absence of an 
express waiver of liability, courts ought to recognize the defense of 
implied assumption of risk in malpractice actions. Both inquiries speak 
to the fundamental question of whether patients should retain a right of 
recovery if they voluntarily choose to accept—either explicitly or 
implicitly—the risks of negligent medical care. 
Traditionalists view the doctor-patient relationship as fiduciary in 
nature, and argue that releasing physicians from liability for malpractice 
on the basis of a patient’s voluntary choice should be prohibited as a 
matter of policy because of the significant disparity in bargaining power 
between doctor and patient.1 Economists and others, however, argue that 
allowing physicians and patients to shift the allocation of risk as they see 
                                                     
1. See infra section II.B.2. 
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fit is necessary to achieve efficiencies that meaningfully benefit both 
parties.2 Still other commentators fall somewhere between these two 
extremes, arguing that physicians should be able to rely on contract- or 
tort-based defenses grounded in a patient’s voluntary acceptance of risk 
only if certain conditions are satisfied.3 
Much of the scholarship in this area either asserts or presumes that 
American courts follow the traditionalist view and rejects any attempts 
by physicians to relieve themselves of liability on the grounds of a 
patient’s agreement to assume the risk of malpractice.4 But, as some 
authors have recognized, the case law by no means establishes a 
categorical prohibition. While most courts do ultimately reject defenses 
based on contract or assumption of risk in medical malpractice cases, a 
position exemplified by the widely cited Tunkl5 case, they often do so 
only after carefully examining the characteristics of the patient’s 
acceptance—an adjudicative approach that is inconsistent with a 
categorical bar.6 More importantly, there are a surprising number of 
cases in which courts have allowed physicians to present such 
defenses—cases involving experimental or alternative therapies, and 
cases involving Jehovah’s Witness patients who request surgery without 
the use of blood or blood products. 
Few authors meaningfully acknowledge these important lines of 
precedent or consider their implications.7 Those who do cite these cases 
                                                     
2. See infra section I.C. 
3. See infra note 89. 
4. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice, Imperfect Information, and the 
Contractual Foundation for Medical Services, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 201, 205 (1986) (referring 
to “courts’ hostility towards all private contracts regulating the risk of medical injuries”); Leonard J. 
Nelson III, Helling v. Carey Revisited: Physician Liability in the Age of Managed Care, 25 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 775, 785 (2002) (“Traditionally, our courts have been unwilling to allow 
contract law to displace tort law in cases involving iatrogenic injury. Tort law imposes certain 
obligations notwithstanding agreements reached by the parties.”); Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking 
Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 908 (1993) (“Tort law has largely eclipsed consent-contract 
approaches to the problem of health-care-related injuries.”); Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of 
Medical Malpractice, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1236 n.191 (2012) (noting that “[c]ontracts purporting 
to . . . reduce doctors’ responsibility for malpractice are not enforceable: courts void such contracts 
on public policy grounds”). 
5. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). 
6. Matthew J. B. Lawrence, In Search of an Enforceable Medical Malpractice Exculpatory 
Agreement: Introducing Confidential Contracts as a Solution to the Doctor-Patient Relationship 
Problem, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850, 855–59 (2009) (noting that some cases analyzing exculpatory 
agreements in the medical malpractice context engage in “case-by-case analysis” of “particular 
bargaining dynamics” and specific contractual language). 
7. Most articles citing these cases do so only tangentially, or in footnotes. But see Mark A. Hall, 
Paying for What You Get and Getting What You Pay for: Legal Responses to Consumer-Driven 
Health Care, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 178–79 (2006) (discussing whether “patients’ 
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often refer to them as “exceptional” or “bizarre,” dismissing them as 
anomalies in an otherwise consistent doctrine barring limitations on 
liability in malpractice actions.8 Very few scholars have made serious 
attempts to reconcile the outcomes of these cases with the traditionalist 
model, or to offer doctrinal justifications for courts’ more 
accommodating attitude towards these defenses in some contexts.9 
This Article argues that it is a mistake to dismiss this line of cases as 
mere footnotes in the jurisprudence, and that scholars should treat these 
contractual and tort law defenses to medical malpractice liability 
seriously. Rather, it is essential to understand why courts have been 
receptive to the argument that patients can, in some contexts, be deemed 
to have accepted the risk of harm arising from a physician’s negligent 
conduct. The outcomes in these cases more accurately reflect the 
principles of patient autonomy upon which the modern doctrine of 
informed consent is grounded, and so offer a valuable counterpoint to 
the paternalistic and protectionist attitudes inherent in the traditionalist 
model—a counterpoint that is particularly relevant in light of the modern 
trend towards consumerism in American health care. 
This Article analyzes the objections traditionally leveled against 
attempts to limit patients’ right of recovery in malpractice cases and 
demonstrates why these objections carry less weight in the contexts of 
experimental or alternative therapies and religiously directed treatment. 
More importantly, it also demonstrates that the best justifications for 
limiting patients’ right to recovery in these narrow situations would also 
apply to many other contexts in which patients pursue unorthodox 
                                                     
informed acceptance of substandard care is a liability defense,” and recognizing “several lines of 
doctrine” to this effect); Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, When Patients Say No (to Save Money): 
An Essay on the Tectonics of Health Law, 41 CONN. L. REV. 743, 762–64 (2008) (arguing that 
waiver of liability and assumption of risk doctrines do not adequately protect physicians whose 
patients seek out low-cost treatment and discussing Schneider v. Revici as an illustrative case); 
Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and 
Health Care Providers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 365 (1989) (analyzing the assumption of risk and 
waiver cases discussed in this Article through the lens of fiduciary contracting).  
8. See, e.g., Anna B. Laakmann, When Should Physicians Be Liable for Innovation, 36 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 913, 942, 966 (2014) (describing Boyle v. Revici, Schneider v. Revici, and Colton v. New 
York Hospital as “notable exception[s]” to courts’ typical rejection of assumption of risk defenses 
and contractual waivers in medical malpractice cases); Lawrence, supra note 6, at 875 (describing 
Schneider v. Revici as “an otherwise strange exception to the categorical rule [barring waivers]”); 
Mehlman, supra note 7, at 411–12 (describing the decision in Schneider v. Revici as “bizarre” and 
“perplexing”). 
9. One notable exception is Maxwell Mehlman, who skillfully analyzes the cases discussed in 
section II.C through the lens of fiduciary contracting and concludes that their outcomes are justified 
by the fact that the agreements in these cases satisfy the conditions for effective contracting—
freedom of choice and adequacy of information. Mehlman, supra note 7, at 401–14. 
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treatment that arguably falls outside the standard of care. Thus, contract- 
and tort-based defenses based on a patient’s voluntary acceptance of risk 
should gain greater traction as patients with consumerist mindsets 
increasingly seek out services that fall outside the medical mainstream 
and that physicians may be unwilling to provide in the absence of 
liability protection. These may include not only experimental and 
alternative therapies and medical care guided by religious dictates, but 
also services like adjusted vaccination schedules, low-cost or low-
intensity care plans, requests for medically unnecessary tests and 
treatments, as well as highly controversial interventions like elective 
amputation and sexual orientation change efforts.10 
The expansion of courts’ reasoning in alternative therapy and 
Jehovah’s Witness cases to other types of patient-directed care is both 
natural and necessary. American law permits patients to exercise their 
autonomy interests by pursuing unorthodox medical treatments that are 
freely available on the market—even treatments that fall outside the 
standard of care. The common law of informed consent is grounded in 
the principle that patients are able to comprehend and evaluate the risks 
and benefits of their treatment options. It would seem consistent with 
these foundational principles to limit a patient’s ability to sue when she 
makes a voluntary and informed choice to accept medical treatment that 
constitutes malpractice, and her physician provides that treatment in 
accordance with the patient’s expectations. That said, expansion of 
physicians’ ability to rely on contract- and tort-based defenses in cases 
of “malpractice by choice” must be mediated by additional patient 
protections. 
Part I of the Article briefly describes the development of modern 
informed consent doctrine and the trend towards consumerist attitudes 
and behaviors in the U.S. health care system, including the resulting 
increase in patient requests for treatments that push the boundaries of 
conventional medical practice. It draws a connection between the shift 
away from medical paternalism towards patient autonomy, and legal 
scholars’ efforts to move the law in a similar direction by allowing 
contractual modifications to physicians’ default duties under tort law. 
Part II explains how contractual waivers of liability and the tort 
doctrine of assumption of risk might be used by health care providers to 
limit liability in medical malpractice actions. It seeks to make a 
significant contribution to the literature in this area by not only 
providing an account of the traditional view rejecting these defenses, but 
                                                     
10. See infra section I.B. 
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also comprehensively tracking and analyzing the cases in which courts 
have been receptive to such defenses. 
Part III seeks to reconcile the inconsistency between the strength of 
courts’ and commentators’ objections to contractual- and tort-based 
limitations on malpractice liability, and their apparent willingness to 
dismiss these objections in alternative therapy and Jehovah’s Witness 
cases. It demonstrates that, although the judicial reasoning in these cases 
is strikingly weak, there are in fact good reasons why courts would be 
willing to limit patients’ right to recovery in these two contexts. 
However, this Part demonstrates that these reasons would apply equally 
well to many other contexts in which patients knowingly seek out 
unorthodox treatment that a jury might conclude falls outside the 
standard of care, provided certain conditions are satisfied—namely, that 
the patient is fully informed of the medical risks and benefits of the 
selected treatment and its alternatives; the risks that ultimately arise are 
those inherent in the treatment and not caused by unanticipated error; 
and the legal fact finder concludes there is some societal value in this 
unorthodox treatment. 
Part IV concludes by addressing the concerns that might arise were 
courts to extend their reasoning in alternative therapy and Jehovah’s 
Witness cases to other contexts of consumer-directed care. First, it 
demonstrates that a pure application of tort and contract law may be 
inadequate to fully protect patients in light of the fiduciary duties owed 
to them by physicians. Thus, it recommends that the use of assumption 
of risk and contract-based defenses in cases of “malpractice by choice” 
ought to be conditioned on the physician’s satisfaction of his informed 
consent duties (including his duty to disclose personal conflicts of 
interest), and on his disclosure of the fact that the treatment the patient 
has selected falls outside the medical standard of care. Second, this Part 
recognizes the concern that, in the absence of malpractice liability, 
physicians may have fewer incentives to practice within the standard of 
care but demonstrates the limitations of this objection. It concludes that 
there are alternative mechanisms by which the medical profession can 
enforce quality standards that do not result in tort compensation for 
patients who voluntarily choose to pursue non-standard medical 
treatments with full knowledge of their risks. 
I. MOVING TOWARDS PATIENT AUTONOMY IN MEDICINE 
AND LAW 
In the second half of the twentieth century, paternalistic medical 
practices gave way to a newfound appreciation for principles of patient 
autonomy. Law and ethics both drove changes to medical practice, 
Sawicki – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  9:48 PM 
2018] CHOOSING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 897 
 
establishing a new duty on the part of physicians to obtain a patient’s 
informed consent before proceeding with treatment. 
This increased emphasis on patient autonomy went hand-in-hand with 
a new view of patients as active consumers of health care. As medicine 
advanced and treatment options expanded, patients found themselves 
able to make choices based on their personal values and preferences.11 
And while patients were previously dependent on their physicians for 
information about medical conditions and treatment options, the internet 
brought greater access to information and gave them the tools to self-
diagnose, learn about treatment options, and choose between providers.12 
Today, providers report an increase in patients actively seeking out 
specific tests and treatments—whether branded pharmaceuticals 
advertised on television, experimental or alternative therapies reported in 
the media, or tests to confirm self-diagnoses based on internet research. 
And some patients, in seeking out treatment consistent with their values 
and beliefs, may request services that fall outside the medical 
mainstream. Examples of such patient-requested care include 
experimental treatment, complementary and alternative therapy, 
modified vaccination schedules, treatment guided by religious beliefs, 
and low-cost or low-intensity care. Some of these services are in fact 
medically appropriate and supported by evidence but rarely available 
due to liability concerns,13 while others are so clearly beyond the 
standard of care that they qualify as quackery.14 
This shift towards a consumerist model of health care was also 
reflected in legal debate. Scholars of law and economics argued that, just 
                                                     
11. The term “preference-sensitive care” is used to describe situations in which “two or more 
medically acceptable options exist and choice should depend on patient preferences.” John E. 
Wennberg, Unwarranted Variations in Healthcare Delivery: Implications for Academic Medical 
Centres, 325 BRITISH MED. J. 961, 962 (2002). 
12. Of course, the quality of health information on the internet varies widely, and patients are not 
well-served by uncritical reliance on online resources. See generally Ahmad Risk & Carolyn 
Petersen, Health Information on the Internet: Quality Issues and International Initiatives, 287 
JAMA 2713 (2002). 
13. One example is vaginal birth after cesarean (VBAC), a practice that the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists describes as safe and appropriate for many women with previous 
cesarean deliveries. Am. Coll. Obstetricians & Gynecologists, ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 115: 
Vaginal Birth After Previous Cesarean Delivery, 116 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 450, 450 
(2010). Nevertheless, many providers and institutions refuse to offer VBAC as a result of liability 
concerns, among other reasons. Farah Diaz-Tello, When the Invisible Hand Wields a Scalpel: 
Maternity Care in a Market Economy, 18 CUNY L. REV. 197, 210–13 (2015); Elizabeth Kukura, 
Choice in Birth: Preserving Access to VBAC, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 955, 967–70 (2009). 
14. See, e.g., Charell v. Gonzalez, 660 N.Y.S.2d 665 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (upholding $4 million 
jury verdict against a physician whose treatment for a patient with uterine cancer included six daily 
coffee enemas). 
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as autonomous patients might have varying preferences about health 
care treatment, so too might they have varying preferences regarding 
legal protection from medical malpractice.15 Rather than deferring to the 
standard set of rights and duties traditionally set by tort law, these 
scholars argued, both patients and physicians would be better served if 
they were free to choose contractual terms that satisfied their 
autonomous preferences.16 
This Part briefly describes the historical development of the doctrine 
of informed consent,17 explains how the principle of autonomy upon 
which the doctrine is based went hand-in-hand with the trend towards 
health care consumerism, and describes the challenges physicians face 
when patients request care that falls outside the medical mainstream. It 
then draws a connection between the increased recognition of patient 
autonomy in medical decision-making and the push by legal scholars to 
move the law in a similar direction by recognizing patients’ right to 
freely contract with their physicians. 
A. Informed Consent and Its Theoretical Underpinnings 
Until the second half of the twentieth century, medicine was a 
fundamentally paternalistic profession.18 Driven by the ethical principles 
of beneficence and non-maleficence, physicians diagnosed patients and 
administered treatments with very little active participation by patients.19 
It was not until the atrocities of Nazi physicians came to light at the 
Nuremberg Trials of the late 1940s that public attention was drawn to 
the need to protect patients from abuse by physicians.20 
American common law had long recognized that physicians may be 
liable for battery if they performed treatment without a patient’s 
consent.21 But the 1950s and 1960s brought new developments in the 
law’s approach to patient rights. Courts began to recognize not only 
physicians’ basic duty to secure a patient’s consent to medical treatment, 
                                                     
15. See infra section I.C. 
16. See infra section I.C. 
17. For a fuller account of the history of the legal and ethical doctrines of informed consent, see 
RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986). 
18. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 20–21 (2002). 
19. Timothy E. Quill & Howard Brody, Physician Recommendations and Patient Autonomy: 
Finding a Balance Between Physician Power and Patient Choice, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
763, 763–64 (1996). 
20. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 17, at 87. 
21. See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905); Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 
105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). 
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but also a duty to ensure that the patient’s consent was granted based on 
full understanding of the risks and benefits of treatment.22 Thus, even if 
a patient agreed to treatment and so could not bring a battery action, she 
could bring a negligence action for the physician’s failure to obtain 
informed consent. These legal developments were driven in part by the 
patients’ rights movement, which emphasized the importance of 
autonomy in medical decision-making.23 Principles of medical ethics 
also shifted to give greater weight to the medical profession’s duty to 
promote patient autonomy, rather than focusing on the traditional 
principles of beneficence and non-maleficence.24 
The modern legal and ethical doctrines of informed consent establish 
that patients have a right to be fully informed before consenting to many 
forms of medical treatment. Physicians, therefore, have a duty to 
disclose the risks and benefits of the treatment in question, the risks and 
benefits of reasonable alternative treatments, and the risks and benefits 
of taking no action. While these duties were originally established by 
common law, many states now have statutes detailing physicians’ duties 
in this regard and establishing remedies for patients whose rights are 
violated.25 
Today, some argue that the pendulum has swung too far in the 
direction of patient autonomy, to the detriment of other important ethical 
values.26 Others argue that the practical implementation of informed 
consent doctrine is fundamentally flawed, and that providing patients 
with information about treatment choices may not in fact serve their best 
                                                     
22. JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 44–46 (2d ed. 
2001); FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 17, at 86–91; Jay Katz, Reflections on Informed Consent: 
40 Years After Its Birth, 186 J. AM. COLL. SURGEONS 466, 467–68 (1998). 
23. See BERG ET AL., supra note 22, at 18–24; FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 17, at 91–98. 
24. BERG ET AL., supra note 22, at 18–20. 
25. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (2018) (requiring disclosure of (1) diagnosis; (2) the 
proposed procedure’s “nature and purpose”; (3) the material risks of “infection, allergic reaction, 
severe loss of blood, loss or loss of function of any limb or organ, paralysis or partial paralysis, 
paraplegia or quadriplegia, disfiguring scar, brain damage, cardiac arrest, or death”; (4) the 
procedure’s likelihood of success; (5) alternative treatments; (6) prognosis if the proposed treatment 
is rejected); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2018) (requiring disclosure of 
“alternatives’’ and “reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits”); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1303.504 (West 2018) (requiring “a description of a procedure” as well as disclosure of “risks and 
alternatives”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.101, 74.104 (West 2018) (requiring 
disclosure of the “risks or hazards” involved in a procedure). 
26. See, e.g., Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision-
Making: The Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 85 (2010); Quill & 
Brody, supra note 19, at 764. 
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interests.27 But these concerns, however well-founded, have not 
undermined the validity of the legal doctrine of informed consent, nor 
the importance of autonomy as a fundamental principle of medical 
ethics. 
B. Patients as Consumers 
The phrase “health care consumerism” is used to describe a variety of 
phenomena relating to patients’ increasingly active role in their medical 
care. For the purposes of this Article, however, the most relevant aspect 
of health care consumerism is patients’ desire to actively participate in 
treatment decisions. This desire has led to patients independently 
researching treatment options, requesting specific treatments that best 
satisfy their personal preferences, and seeking out providers willing to 
offer these treatments. 
Sociologists in the 1970s first recognized the trend towards 
consumerism in health care.28 Whereas the relationship between 
physician and patient was traditionally a power relationship grounded in 
deference to medical authority and expertise, patients’ attitudes began to 
change, “shift[ing] away from patient-as-supplicant to patient-as-
skeptic.”29 Armed with newfound societal recognition of the value of 
individual autonomy, patients became more willing to challenge 
physicians’ authority.30 Indeed, the changing language used to describe 
                                                     
27. See, e.g., JOE ALPER, ROUNDTABLE ON HEALTH LITERACY, BOARD ON POPULATION HEALTH 
AND PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE, AND INST. OF MED., INFORMED CONSENT AND HEALTH LITERACY: 
WORKSHOP SUMMARY (2015) (discussing how low health literacy impacts the efficacy of the 
informed consent process); Wendy Netter Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision-Making, 92 WASH. L. 
REV. 1255 (2017) (arguing that, compared to pure deference to patient autonomy, incorporating 
“nudges” into the medical decision-making process leads to better patient decisions); Jay Katz, 
Informed Consent—A Fairy Tale? Law’s Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 139 (1977) (describing 
the legal doctrine of informed consent as a “symbol” which “has had little impact on patients’ 
decision-making, either in legal theory or medical practice”); Marshall B. Kapp, Patient Autonomy 
in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health Care: Informed Consent and Informed Choice, 28 LEG. 
MED. 91, 99–101 (2007) (providing an overview of critiques of informed consent in action); 
Schuck, supra note 4, at 903–04 (describing the gap between the ideals of informed consent 
doctrine and its practical effect). 
28. See, e.g., Marie R. Haug & Bebe Lavin, Public Challenge of Physician Authority, 17 MED. 
CARE 844, 844 (1979); Leo G. Reeder, The Patient-Client as a Consumer: Some Observations on 
the Changing Professional-Client Relationship, J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 406, 406 (1972). 
29. Clare Louise Stacey et al., Demanding Patient or Demanding Encounter?: A Case Study of a 
Cancer Clinic, 69 SOC. SCI. & MED. 729, 730 (2009); see also Marie R. Haug & Bebe Lavin, 
Practitioner or Patient—Who’s in Charge?, J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 212, 212 (1981) (describing 
models of professional power in health care).  
30. Haug & Lavin, Public Challenge of Physician Authority, supra note 28 (finding that 
substantial proportions of patients are willing to challenge physician authority); Haug & Lavin, 
 
Sawicki – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  9:48 PM 
2018] CHOOSING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 901 
 
patients—now “consumers” of health care—reflected these changing 
societal roles.31 As Leo Reeder wrote in an influential 1972 article 
describing the consumerist phenomenon in health care: 
As a client[,] . . . the individual delivers himself into the hands 
of the professional—who presumably is the sole decision-maker 
regarding the nature of the services to be delivered. On the other 
hand, when the individual is viewed as a consumer, he is a 
purchaser of services and tends to be guided by caveat emptor.32 
These changes were—and continue to be—facilitated by greater 
public access to information about health and health care. Given that the 
traditional power relationship between doctor and patient was justified in 
part due to physicians’ monopoly on medical knowledge, anything that 
bridged this knowledge gap contributed to the weakening of physicians’ 
authority.33 From the “do-it-yourself health books” of the 1970s and 
1980s,34 to the internet boom of the 1990s and 2000s,35 to the rise of 
direct to consumer drug advertising,36 patients have gradually developed 
                                                     
Practitioner or Patient—Who’s in Charge?, supra note 29, at 212 (finding that substantial 
proportions of both physicians and patients “express beliefs and report actions congruent with [a] 
consumerist perspective”); Quill & Brody, supra note 19, at 764 (“The consumer movement has 
taught patients to be more assertive, to question physicians’ recommendations, and to demand 
interventions that might otherwise be withheld.”). 
31. Reeder, supra note 28, at 408. 
32. Id. at 409 (emphasis in original); see also Haug & Lavin, Practitioner or Patient—Who’s in 
Charge?, supra note 29, at 213 (“Caveat emptor, ‘let the buyer beware,’ rather than trust in the 
seller’s goodwill, characterizes the transaction.”). 
33. Haug & Lavin, Public Challenge of Physician Authority, supra note 28, at 846, 850 (finding 
that health knowledge and education leads to attitudes challenging physician authority); Haug & 
Lavin, Practitioner or Patient—Who’s in Charge?, supra note 29, at 212 (noting that the power 
relationship between doctor and patient is based in part on “the profession’s monopoly on 
knowledge not easily accessible to the public”). 
34. Haug & Lavin, Public Challenge of Physician Authority, supra note 28, at 844; Haug & 
Lavin, Practitioner or Patient—Who’s in Charge?, supra note 29, at 213. 
35. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, The Fiduciary Obligation of Physicians 
to ‘Just Say No’ if an ‘Informed’ Patient Demands Services that Are Not Medically Indicated, 39 
SETON HALL L. REV. 335, at 346–49 (2009) (discussing research about patient internet use); Stacey 
et al., supra note 29, at 731 (summarizing research about the challenges associated with internet-
informed patients); id. at 734 (noting that “demanding” patient encounters “generally resulted when 
patients used knowledge gleaned on the internet to push for particular treatments or therapies”). 
36. Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 35, at 352–61 (discussing impact of direct to 
consumer advertising on patient requests and prescribing practices); Mark Peyrot et al., Direct-to-
Consumer Ads Can Influence Behavior, 18 MKTG. HEALTH SERVS. 27 (1998) (analyzing factors 
associated with consumer prescription drug knowledge and requests); Mary Beth Pinto et al., The 
Impact of Pharmaceutical Direct Advertising: Opportunities and Obstructions, 15 HEALTH MKTG. 
Q. 89 (1998) (discussing benefits and drawbacks of direct to consumer advertising, including impact 
on patients and providers); Stacey et al., supra note 29, at 730 (“‘Patients’’ roles as consumers are 
reinforced in several ways, including direct-to-consumer advertising by drug companies.”). 
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the ability to collect information and investigate medical options without 
relying on physician expertise. 
Changes in modern medicine also contributed to this trend. As new 
treatments for common conditions developed, patients’ options 
expanded. Rather than being limited to a single viable treatment option, 
today’s patients are often offered a variety of approaches for managing 
and treating their illnesses. How these patients choose to proceed often 
has as much to do with their personal values and preferences—balancing 
quality of life issues against the possibility of extending life, for 
example—as with the clinical efficacy of the various treatment options.37 
The practical result of these societal changes is that today’s patients 
are more assertive38 in voicing their concerns and more persistent39 in 
seeking out the care that satisfies their personal preferences. Rather than 
deferring to physicians’ recommendations, patients view the physician-
patient encounter as an opportunity for bargaining and negotiation.40 
Research indicates that many patients enter the physician-patient 
encounter with “specific expectations for care.”41 For example, patients 
may request prescription drugs that they learned about through direct-to-
consumer advertising;42 ask for antibiotics in situations when they are 
                                                     
37. See generally Ronald M. Epstein & Ellen Peters, Beyond Information: Exploring Patients’ 
Preferences, 302 JAMA 195 (2009) (discussing how patients construct preferences when several 
treatment options exist); Wennberg, supra note 11 (describing the phenomenon of preference-
sensitive care). 
38. Quill & Brody, supra note 19 (“The consumer movement has taught patients to be more 
assertive, to question physicians’ recommendations, and to demand interventions that might 
otherwise be withheld.”). 
39. Drew Foster, ‘Keep Complaining til Someone Listens’: Exchanges of Tacit Healthcare 
Knowledge in Online Illness Communities, 166 SOC. SCI. & MED. 25, 25 (2016) (finding that online 
patient communities serve as forums in which patients can learn how to “receive their desired form 
of care from the health system and to negotiate relationships with medical professionals and 
institutions,” and that these communities view persistence is a necessary strategy when seeking out 
high-quality medical care). 
40. Haug & Lavin, Practitioner or Patient—Who’s in Charge?, supra note 29, at 213; Richard L. 
Kravitz et al., Characterizing Patient Requests and Physician Responses in Office Practice, 37 
HEALTH SVCS. RES. 215, 216 (2002); Reeder, supra note 28, at 409. 
41. Stacey et al., supra note 29, at 732; see also Kravitz et al., infra note 45, at 1673 (finding that 
23% of patients, in an observational study of patient visits to physicians, requested at least one test, 
new prescription, or referral); cf. B. Mitchell Peck et al., Do Unmet Expectations for Specific Tests, 
Referrals, and New Medications Reduce Patients’ Satisfaction?, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1080, 
1082, 1085 (2004) (finding that 56% of patients seeing their primary care providers have at least one 
“expectation for a test, referral, or new medication,” but that many of these expectations are 
“vague”).  
42. Nicky Britten & Obioha Ukoumunne, The Influence of Patients’ Hopes of Receiving a 
Prescription on Doctors’ Perceptions and the Decision to Prescribe, 315 BMJ: BRITISH MED. J. 
7121 (1997) (finding, in a survey of over 500 patients waiting to see their general practitioners, that 
67% hoped for a prescription); Benjamin Lewin, Patient Satisfaction with Physician Responses 
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not appropriate,43 or request specific diagnostic tests or referrals.44 When 
their expectations are not met, patients are more likely to be dissatisfied 
with their medical care.45 If they have the freedom to do so, patients may 
choose to “shop around” to find providers who are willing to comply 
with their requests.46 
Perhaps not surprisingly, these consumerist trends have impacted 
medical practice. One author described “fulfillment of patient 
                                                     
During Interactions Prompted by Pharmaceutical Advertisements, 50 SOC. SCI. J. 491 (2013) 
(finding that direct-to-consumer drug advertising shapes patients’ expectations and leads patients to 
mention or request specific drugs to their physicians). Many physicians have negative views of 
patient demands for prescription medication, in part because they believe these demands are based 
on incorrect information or unreasonable expectations. Peyrot et al., supra note 36, at 28 (“Often 
physicians view advertising as a challenge to medical authority, and fear that patients will make 
inappropriate drug requests.”); id. at 94 (“Advertising that is intended to increase the demand for 
drugs is also likely to increase the number of people making incorrect assumptions about the 
appropriateness of these medications. When patients demand specific prescriptions, they may 
collide with physicians more knowledgeable about the efficacy of the drug in question.”); Woodie 
M. Zachry III et al., Clinicians’ Responses to Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription 
Medications, 163 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1808, 1808 (2003) (finding that physicians are more 
likely to become “annoyed’ and “frustrated” when patients ask about medications they learned 
about through direct-to-consumer drug advertising than through other sources of information). 
43. Tanya Stivers, Participating in Decisions about Treatment: Overt Parent Pressure for 
Antibiotic Medication in Pediatric Encounters, 54 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1111, 1111 (2002) 
(summarizing research finding that pediatric physicians prescribe antibiotics as a result of parental 
insistence, even when their appropriateness is questionable). 
44. Kravitz et al., supra note 40, at 229; Richard L. Kravitz, Measuring Patients’ Expectations 
and Requests, 134 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 881, 884 (2001); Jerry Menikoff, Demanded Medical 
Care, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1091, 1098 (1998). 
45. See Robert A. Bell et al., Unmet Expectations for Care and the Patient-Physician 
Relationship, 17 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 817, 820 (2002) (finding that patients who held unmet 
expectations for care were less satisfied); Richard L. Kravitz et al., Direct Observation of Requests 
for Clinical Services in Office Practice: What Do Patients Want and Do They Get It?, 163 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1673, 1678 (2003) (finding that patient satisfaction was significantly 
decreased when a physician failed to fulfill an “action request” by a patient); Lewin, supra note 42 
(finding that patients who mention a specific drug to their physicians and do not receive a 
prescription for that drug are less likely to be satisfied). But see Peck, supra note 41, at 1080–81, 
84–85 (discussing research related to patient expectations and satisfaction but ultimately finding 
“little support for the relationship between fulfillment of specific expectations and patient 
satisfaction”). 
46. Stacey et al., supra note 29, at 730; see also Kristin K. Barker, Electronic Support Groups, 
Patient-Consumers, and Medicalization: The Case of Contested Illness, 49 J. HEALTH & SOC. 
BEHAV. 20, 20 (2008) (finding that participants “empower each other to search for physicians who 
will recognize and treat their condition accordingly”); Haug & Lavin, Practitioner or Patient—
Who’s in Charge?, supra note 29, at 214; Drug Advertising Prompts Patient Discussion with 
Physicians, Study Shows, HEALTH CARE STRATEGIC MGMT., at 7 (Sept. 1, 1999) (describing doctor 
shopping phenomenon); cf. Haug & Lavin, Practitioner or Patient—Who’s in Charge?, supra note 
29, at 233 (recognizing that some patients may not have the economic flexibility to change 
providers). 
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expectations” as “a major—if not the major—concern for clinicians.”47 
Indeed, research indicates that when patients make requests or have 
specific expectations, physicians are more likely to comply than when 
patients don’t have such expectations.48 A 2003 study, for example, 
showed that physicians are more likely to provide a referral or new 
prescription to a patient who makes such a request.49 A 1997 study found 
that physicians are more likely to prescribe medications when they 
believe that their patients expect a prescription,50 even if it is not 
medically indicated.51 
When physicians express frustration with “difficult” or “demanding” 
patients, they are often responding directly to patients’ consumerist 
attitudes and expectations.52 Some physicians now believe that their best 
safeguard against patient dissatisfaction is offering patients a “cafeteria” 
                                                     
47. Peck, supra note 41, at 1080; see also Kravitz, supra note 44, at 881 (finding that meeting 
patient expectations, and in turn, increasing patient satisfaction, is correlated with “a lower 
propensity to sue for malpractice”); Zachry et al., supra note 42, at 1811 (noting that patient 
expectations for drug treatment may place pressure on physicians to meet those expectations). 
48. Kravitz et al., supra note 45, at 1680 (“It is perhaps unrealistic to expect that physicians will 
refuse to provide clinical services to patients whose requests are sufficiently strident.”); Kravitz, 
supra note 44, at 881 (“By acceding to the patient’s request, the physician avoided a confrontation 
with the patient but left herself vulnerable to the disapproval of her colleagues.”). 
49. Kravitz et al., supra note 45. 
50. Jill Cockburn & Sabrina Pit, Prescribing Behaviour in Clinical Practice: Patients’ 
Expectations and Doctors’ Perceptions of Patients’ Expectations, 315 BRITISH MED. J. 520, 520 
(1997) (finding that patients who expected a prescription were almost three times more likely to 
receive it than patients who came in without such expectations, and that physicians who thought 
their patient had such expectations were ten times more likely to prescribe). 
51. Britten & Ukoumunne, supra note 42, at 1506 (finding that 22% of prescriptions written were 
“not strictly indicated on purely medical grounds”); Keerthi Gogineni et al., Patient Demands and 
Requests for Cancer Tests and Treatments, 1 JAMA ONCOLOGY 33, 35–36 (2015) (identifying 
“clinically inappropriate” patient requests as including requests for imaging studies, palliative 
treatments, and laboratory tests); Quill & Brody, supra note 19 (noting that “[t]he consumer 
movement has taught patients to . . . demand interventions that might otherwise be withheld”); 
Stivers, supra note 43, at 1127 (finding that parental pressure for antibiotics “can push physicians to 
prescribe antibiotics even when their appropriateness is questionable”). 
52. Bell et al., supra note 45, at 820 (finding that “visits in which patients reported an unmet 
expectation were perceived by physicians as being more demanding and less satisfying”); Kravitz et 
al., supra note  45, at 1680 (“Physicians experienced visits in which patients requested diagnostic 
tests as particularly demanding.”); Kravitz, et al., supra note 40, at 217 (noting that patient requests 
for diagnostic tests, medications, and referrals “may foment patient-physician discord or distrust if 
not handled properly.”); Stacey et al., supra note 29, at 729 (noting that “demanding” patient 
encounters “tend to happen when patients directly or indirectly challenge physician judgment, 
authority or jurisdiction,” often as a result of consumerist tendencies or internet research); Zachry et 
al., supra note 42 (finding that physicians are likely to become “annoyed” and “frustrated” when 
patients ask about medications they learned about through direct-to-consumer drug advertising). 
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of options from which to choose—even if that is at odds with their own 
perceptions about best medical practice.53 
The fact that some patients’ expectations and requests for care do not 
align with best practices in medical care is particularly problematic. As 
noted above, many physicians report that patients regularly request 
unnecessary diagnostic tests and prescriptions—but providing these 
services, while professionally questionable, is unlikely to cause most 
patients significant harm. An unnecessary diagnostic test may result in a 
false positive, causing a patient anxiety about a medical condition she 
does not have; taking an unnecessary prescription may cause side effects 
that she could otherwise have avoided—but as a general matter, the risk 
of harm to patients from such accommodations is limited.54 
That said, some patients seek out treatments that fall at the boundaries 
of responsible medical practice despite the significant medical risks of 
doing so. Section II.C.1, for instance, describes lawsuits by cancer 
patients who chose to forgo traditional treatments like chemotherapy and 
radiation that could have saved their lives, and instead sought out 
physicians offering alternative therapies that juries concluded were 
outside the standard of care. Another example can be found in parents 
skeptical of childhood vaccination, who often seek out “alternative 
vaccine schedules” that put their children (and others) at risk of 
infectious disease.55 Physicians often comply with these requests,56 
                                                     
53. Quill & Brody, supra note 19, at 764 (“Many physicians feel that giving patients the full 
range of choices and withholding their own recommendations are safeguards against lawsuits.”); cf. 
Alan Meisel & Mark Kuczewski, Legal and Ethical Myths about Informed Consent, 156 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 2521, 2523 (1996) (challenging the myth that the legal doctrine of “informed 
consent requires physicians to operate a medical cafeteria, in which they must set out all the 
therapeutic options and let patients choose, each according to his or her own appetite”). 
54. Note, however, that the provision of such unnecessary care may cause harms at societal level, 
by contributing to the rising costs of health care and, in turn, insurance premiums and government 
expenditures. Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent and Societal Stewardship, 45 J. L. MED. & 
ETHICS 41, at 43–44 (2017) (patient choices may also have significant public health consequences, 
as in the case of non-vaccination); Wendy Netter Epstein, The Health Insurer Nudge, 91 S. CAL. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009823 [https://perma.cc/RL76-GJXC]; see 
also Lisa A. Newman, Contralateral Prophylactic Mastectomy: Is It a Reasonable Option?, 312 
JAMA 895, 896 (2014) (considering whether medically unnecessary contralateral prophylactic 
mastectomies are an “unjustified expense” in an era of scarce health care resources).  
55. Paul A. Offit & Charlotte A. Moser, The Problem with Dr Bob’s Alternative Vaccine 
Schedule, 123 PEDIATRICS e164, e164 (2009); see also Allison Kempe et al., Physician Response to 
Parental Requests to Spread out the Recommended Vaccine Schedule, 135 PEDIATRICS 666, 666 
(2015) (finding that 93% of pediatricians and family physicians surveyed reported parents making 
such requests in an average month); Vaccine Schedule: Altering the Schedule, CHILDREN’S HOSP. 
PHILA., http://www.chop.edu/centers-programs/vaccine-education-center/vaccine-schedule/altering-
the-schedule [https://perma.cc/G2NA-7CJM] (noting that “some parents now feel they should 
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despite the fact that these alternative approaches have been described by 
experts as being based on “bad science.”57 Some authors believe that 
doctors who allow their patients to negotiate childhood vaccination 
“flirt[] with malpractice.”58 
Many other alternative and experimental therapies are risky not only 
because they are sought out in lieu of traditional therapies with proven 
success, but also because they pose significant independent risks of their 
own. For example, a variety of alternative treatments of questionable 
efficacy are marketed to parents of children with autism spectrum 
disorder, many of whom choose to pursue complementary and 
alternative therapies.59 While some of these alternative treatments pose 
no safety risks,60 others can be quite harmful.61 Chelation therapy, for 
example, was originally developed as a treatment for lead toxicity, and is 
used to remove essential minerals from the bloodstream.62 However, 
when used in children who do not have lead poisoning, chelation therapy 
can lead to cognitive impairments and even fatalities; its use resulted in 
                                                     
approach the childhood immunization schedule in an a la carte manner, giving their children only 
those vaccines that they feel are appropriate”). 
56. Kempe et al., supra note 55, at 669–70 (finding that 37% of pediatricians and family 
physicians “often” or “always” agreed to delay vaccines at a parent’s request, and 37% “sometimes” 
agreed to do so).  
57. Offit & Moser, supra note 55. 
58. Jim Anderson, Are Immunization Schedules Negotiable?, CLINICAL ADVISOR (Oct. 22, 2015), 
http://www.clinicaladvisor.com/the-waiting-room/are-immunization-schedules-negotiable/article/ 
448840/ [https://perma.cc/U98K-W6GL]. 
59. According to some studies, somewhere between 52% and 95% of parents of children with 
autism now seek out complementary and alternative therapies. R. Scott Akins, Kathy Angkustsiri & 
Robin L. Hansen, Complementary and Alternative Medicine in Autism: An Evidence-Based 
Approach to Negotiating Safe and Efficacious Interventions with Families, 7 NEUROTHERAPEUTICS 
307, 308 (2010). 
60. Id. (citing music therapy, yoga, vitamins, dietary changes, essential fatty acids, amino acids, 
craniosacral manipulation, acupuncture, massage, and others as examples of safe interventions with 
unknown efficacy or no efficacy). 
61. Id. (citing chelation therapy, antifungal agents, hyperbaric oxygen therapy, and immune 
therapies as examples of interventions that are unsafe or whose safety is unknown, and whose use 
should be discouraged); see also Alisa Opar, The Dangers of Snake-Oil Treatments for Autism, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 22 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/09/fringe-therapies-
spectrum/501023/ [https://perma.cc/42TN-CVFB] (describing various dangerous treatments sought 
out by parents of children with autism, including chelation, hyperbaric oxygen therapy, ingestion of 
chemicals, and others); Trine Tsouderos & Patricia Callahan, Risky Alternative Therapies for 
Autism Have Little Basis in Science, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 22, 2009), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
lifestyles/health/chi-autism-treatments-nov22-story.html [https://perma.cc/Y9CM-JXZB]. 
62. Akins et al., supra note 59, at 312. 
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three deaths between 2003 and 2005, and the FDA has recently issued a 
warning about the use of chelation therapy for autism.63 
Finally, some patients seek out treatments that have been clearly 
rejected by the U.S. medical community as falling outside the standard 
of care. Sexual orientation conversion therapy (SOCE), for example, is 
viewed by the majority of health care providers as ineffective and 
unethical, and its use has been challenged by most professional 
regulatory bodies.64 Many states have recently passed legislation barring 
health care providers from offering such therapy (at least to minors).65 
And despite research demonstrating that many patients suffer significant 
harms as a result of SOCE—ranging from loss of self-esteem to sexual 
dysfunction to suicide66—patients continue to seek it out, resulting in 
ethical challenges for providers who believe that such therapy violates 
professional standards.67 
Another, more striking example of a patient-requested service that has 
been roundly rejected by the medical community is when patients 
suffering from body dysmorphic disorder or apotemnophilia seek out 
physicians willing to amputate healthy limbs.68 Doctors abroad have 
                                                     
63. Id.; Autism: Beware of Potentially Dangerous Therapies and Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN. (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm394757.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6ER2-DN9G]. 
64. See Douglas C. Haldeman, Gay Rights, Patient Rights: The Implications of Sexual 
Orientation Conversion Therapy, 33 PROF’L PSYCHOL. 260, 260 (2002); Jon S. Lasser & Michael 
C. Gottlieb, Treating Patients Distressed Regarding Their Sexual Orientation: Clinical and Ethical 
Alternatives, 35 PROF’L PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 194, 194 (2004); Michael Schroeder & Ariel 
Shidlo, Ethical Issues in Sexual Orientation Conversion Therapies: An Empirical Study of 
Consumers, 5 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY 131, 131 (2008). 
65. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding New Jersey ban on 
conversion therapy); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1236 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding California 
ban on conversion therapy for children); see also D.C. CODE § 7-1231.14a (2015) (prohibiting 
mental health professionals from engaging in sexual orientation change efforts with minors); 405 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 48/30 (2016) (same); H.B. 2307, 78th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015).  
66. See Douglas C. Haldeman, Therapeutic Antidotes: Helping Gay and Bisexual Men Recover 
from Conversion Therapies, 5 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY 117, 117 (2002); Ariel Shidlo & 
Michael Schroeder, Changing Sexual Orientation: A Consumer’s Report, 33 PROF’L PSYCHOL. 249, 
at 254–55 (2002). 
67. See Lasser & Gottleib, supra note 64; Haldeman, supra note 64; Schroeder & Shidlo, supra 
note 64. 
68. Annemarie Bridy, Confounding Extremities: Surgery at the Medico-Ethical Limits of Self-
Modification, 32 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 148, 148 (2004); Aimee Louise Bryant, Consent, Autonomy, 
and the Benefits of Healthy Limb Amputation: Examining the Legality of Surgically Managing Body 
Integrity Identity Disorder in New Zealand, 8 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 281, 281 (2011); Josephine 
Johnston & Carl Elliott, Healthy Limb Amputation: Ethical and Legal Aspects, 2 CLINICAL MED. 
431, 431 (2002). 
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been willing to perform such surgeries at a patient’s request,69 arguing 
that it is both ethically appropriate and therapeutically valuable to 
patients who would otherwise live with “a desire so obsessive that it 
leads to thoughts of suicide.”70 But there is no indication that U.S. 
physicians are willing to do so, in part because of professional 
opposition to the practice,71 and in part because of the significant risk of 
liability.72 
While some of these examples seem extreme, they are offered to 
demonstrate the range of services that patient-consumers seek out from 
the medical community. Medical services that are not universally 
accepted as being within the standard of care fall on a broad spectrum, 
ranging from services that are accepted by a substantial minority of 
physicians (which, depending on a state’s medical malpractice law, may 
fall within the standard of care), to services that are supported by 
evidence but are not customarily offered by physicians because of 
liability concerns,73 to services that clearly fall outside the scope of 
responsible medical practice and are almost uniformly rejected. 
When patients suffer injury as a result of these treatments and 
ultimately seek recovery, the final decision about whether a treatment 
falls outside the standard of care is typically made by a jury. To make 
this determination, jurors certainly look to the testimony of expert 
witnesses, but they also imbue their decisions with their own value 
                                                     
69. See Clare Dyer, Surgeon Amputated Healthy Limbs, 320 BMJ: BRITISH MED. J. 7231, 7231 
(2000). 
70. Johnston & Elliott, supra note 68, at 432; see also Bridy, supra note 68, at 153 (“The issue is 
made particularly difficult by the conceptual chasm between people . . . who in their best clinical 
judgment believe that elective amputation can be therapeutically beneficial, and people . . . who 
express an automatic but principled conviction that the surgery has no therapeutic value and 
represents a per se violation of medical ethics.” (emphasis added)). 
71. See Jason Beckford-Ball, The Amputation of Healthy Limbs Is Not an Option, 9 BRITISH J. 
NURSING 188, 188 (2000) (arguing that health care professionals should not “collude with people’s 
distorted body image” and “legitimize self-harm” by amputating healthy limbs); Randy Dotinga, 
Out on a Limb, SALON (Aug. 29, 2000, 12:00 PM), https://www.salon.com/2000/08/29/amputation/ 
[https://perma.cc/KE6N-Q5FE] (quoting medical ethicist Arthur Caplan describing medical 
amputation of healthy limbs as a violation of the Hippocratic Oath and as “absolute, utter lunacy”); 
Johnston & Elliott, supra note 68 (concluding that ethical concerns stand in the way of professional 
acceptance of healthy limb amputation). 
72. Johnston & Elliott, supra note 68, at 432 (noting that “a court might consider a healthy limb 
amputation . . . to be negligent because the procedure is not yet considered by a responsible body of 
medical opinion to be an appropriate and effective treatment of a medical condition”). 
73. A well-recognized problem with the fact that the standard of care in medicine is defined by 
professional custom is that the adoption of changes—even very beneficial ones—is slow. Evidence 
may support a new treatment option, but physicians may be unwilling to adopt it if their colleagues 
have not done so because without such widespread adoption a jury could not find that the new 
treatment was customary within the community. See infra note 284. 
Sawicki – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  9:48 PM 
2018] CHOOSING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 909 
 
judgments—about whether the plaintiff or the defendant is more reliable, 
about what they would want their own physicians to do, and about 
whether injured plaintiffs are deserving of compensation at all. It is 
possible that a jury may impose liability on a physician for conduct that 
is generally accepted as being within the standard of care, simply due to 
the testimony of a sympathetic plaintiff who has suffered serious 
injuries. 
“Value judgments, then, are inherent in the determination of virtually 
any medical standard of care.”74 As a result, it can be challenging for 
physicians to predict where patient-requested care falls on the spectrum, 
whether complying with a patient’s request for unorthodox treatment or 
denying it is more likely to subject them to malpractice liability. Thus, 
physicians make value judgments here too, balancing the likelihood of 
harm resulting from complying with a patient request with the likelihood 
of patient dissatisfaction or harm from denying it. Given that it can be 
difficult to predict whether a jury will view a physician’s conduct as 
falling within the standard of care, the preparation of defenses, like 
assumption of risk and contractual waiver, becomes extremely 
important. 
C. The Scholarly Debate: Contract, Tort, and Fiduciary Principles 
The shift towards a consumerist and autonomy-based model of health 
care significantly impacted the practice of medicine. However, these 
changes also had implications beyond the realm of medical decision-
making, prompting discussion in legal spheres about the common law’s 
treatment of patients seeking legal recovery for medical malpractice.75 
Legal scholars highlighted a fundamental inconsistency between modern 
informed consent law’s conception of patients as autonomous agents, 
and courts’ ongoing reliance on a “vulnerable patient” narrative to 
support policy arguments barring enforcement of contractual waivers of 
liability.76 
                                                     
74. Menikoff, supra note 44, at 1108. 
75. Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 
126–27 (1976) (describing freedom of contract as “an outgrowth of the principle of personal 
autonomy”); Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era of Scarce 
Resources: Is There a Duty to Treat?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 349, 355 (1992) (“A contractual approach 
to the patient-physician relationship is also suggested by . . . the movement to increase patient 
autonomy.”). 
76. Epstein, supra note 75, at 127 (arguing that the view that patients are “incompetent to fend for 
themselves” is inconsistent with the lengths the law goes to in ensuring that patients are well-
informed); see also Laakmann, supra note 8, at 933 (noting that court’s “hostil[ity] to the defense of 
implied assumption of risk . . . subtly undermines the rationale behind the informed consent 
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Scholars began to consider whether, just as patients are better served 
by making autonomous health care choices rather than deferring to the 
paternalistic choices of the medical profession, patients might likewise 
be better served if they had the opportunity to contract with their 
providers for terms that satisfy their preferences rather than be subject to 
the default rights and duties set by tort law. 
This conversation was driven primarily by scholars of law and 
economics, who viewed contract law as a solution to the “medical 
malpractice crisis” of the 1980s.77 They were responding to a legal 
regime in which courts were resistant to enforcing contractual 
modifications to health care providers’ duties or patients’ right to 
recovery.78 The default liability rules set by tort law, these scholars 
argued, were too favorable to plaintiffs and therefore encouraged high 
malpractice payouts—leading to increased malpractice insurance 
premiums, increased costs to patients, and physicians leaving the 
practice of medicine.79 In their view, not only was the tort regime 
unfavorable to defendant physicians, but it also imposed costs on 
patients who might not want or need the protection of tort law.80 
Changing the medical malpractice system, they argued, would be a 
natural extension of recent changes in health care delivery and 
financing.81 
                                                     
doctrine, as it implies that patients are summarily incapable of making rational choices about 
uncertain treatments”); Glen O. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks 
Between Patients and Providers, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 193 (1986) (“[T]he assumption of 
patient ignorance is at odds with the trend toward greater physician disclosure as a prerequisite of 
informed consent, which is premised on a new appreciation of the value of patient autonomy and 
responsibility in making choices about health care.”). 
77. A full issue of the 1986 volume of Law and Contemporary Problems was dedicated to 
addressing this problem. 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2 (1986). 
78. See infra section II.B. 
79. Epstein, supra note 75, at 87–89. 
80. Much of the discussion surrounding contractual modifications to physicians’ tort law duties 
centered around the need for cost containment and the hypothetical “cost-conscious patient.” See 
Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma: Market Opportunities and Legal 
Obstacles, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 149 (1986) [hereinafter Havighurst, Private Reform of 
Tort-Law Dogma] (“[I]f some consumers are demanding economy, a strong argument can be made 
for allowing a provider’s legal obligations to vary so that a less costly product can be delivered in 
response to that demand.”); Clark C. Havighurst, Altering the Applicable Standard of Care, 49 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 275 (1986) [hereinafter Havighurst, Standard of Care] (“[C]onsumers 
should not be deprived by law of their freedom to opt for fewer costly legal rights than the legal 
monopoly seeks to confer upon them.”). 
81. Epstein, supra note 4, at 201 (arguing that the transformation of the health care delivery 
system should provide guidance in the context of medical malpractice reform); Havighurst, Private 
Reform of Tort-Law Dogma, supra note 80, at 143 (“[P]rivate reform in the area of medical 
malpractice squares nicely both with recent developments in national health policy and with recent 
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The primary argument made by this school was that it would be more 
efficient if patients and providers could freely contract to set the terms of 
their relationships and the consequences of non-performance, rather than 
having standards of care and liability rules imposed upon them by the 
tort law system. They argued that the traditional barriers to efficient 
contracting—lack of choice82 and lack of information83—were either 
disappearing in the modern health care environment, or could be easily 
overcome.84 Scholars further supported this economic argument by 
pointing to legal theory, arguing that the consensual relationship 
between doctor and patient more closely resembles commercial 
relationships governed by contract than the relationships between 
strangers typically governed by tort law.85 The malpractice crisis, they 
argued, was simply evidence of the fact that tort law is an imperfect fit 
in this context. 
The contractual terms that scholars believed should be negotiable 
between doctor and patient included terms relating to allocation of costs, 
size of recovery, arbitration, standards of care, no-fault compensation, 
collateral sources, periodic payments, punitive damages, proof of breach, 
and limitation of liability to gross negligence.86 Of these, the most 
                                                     
changes in the health care industry itself.”); Robinson, supra note 76, at 180 (arguing that economic 
changes in the health care industry should cause us to rethink malpractice liability rules); id. at 198 
(arguing that courts’ paternalistic attitude in barring contractual modifications to liability rules “is 
out of touch with the reality of modern health care services”). 
82. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma, supra note 80, at 144 (identifying “the 
emergence of a competitive market for health services and new opportunities for informed 
purchasing by consumers” as a reason to support health care contracting); Robinson, supra note 76, 
at 186–87 (citing the prevalence of elective procedures and low-value care to support the argument 
that patients seeking medical care have the opportunity for reasonable deliberation among various 
options). 
83. Epstein, supra note 4, at 202 (arguing that disclosure requirements could remedy the 
information gap between doctor and patient); Robinson, supra note 76, at 188–93 (dismissing 
arguments about patients’ comparative lack of information as flawed). 
84. Relatedly, some argued that concerns about barriers to efficient contracting are resolvable by 
having sophisticated agents like employers or insurers (rather than patients) engaging in negotiation 
of contract terms. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 210; William H. Ginsburg et al., Contractual 
Revisions to Medical Malpractice Liability, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 256 (1986); Havighurst, 
Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma, supra note 80, at 168–69. 
85. Epstein, supra note 4, at 211 (arguing that “there is nothing special, much less sacred, about 
medical services that justifies exempting them from ordinary contracting processes”); Robinson, 
supra note 76, at 182–83 (arguing that twentieth century efforts to professionalize medicine and 
distinguish it from commercial practice fail to recognize that “the provider/patient relationship is 
grounded in contract and most of the economic terms are set by the usual elements of contract 
formation”).  
86. See Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma, supra note 80, at 161–62; Ginsburg et 
al., supra note 84, at 258–63. 
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challenging to defend were modifications of the customary standard of 
care87 and complete waivers of liability,88 both of which, according to 
some, pushed the boundaries of unconscionability. 
Modern scholars have challenged the full freedom-of-contract view, 
and many have instead offered more nuanced approaches for ensuring 
that both patients and physicians can effectively satisfy their preferences. 
For example, some argue that applying pure contract principles in the 
health care context fails to take into account the fiduciary basis of the 
doctor-patient relationship, and that therefore contractual modifications 
ought to be subject to a set of standards that takes these fiduciary duties 
into account.89 Others argue that resorting to contract law is unnecessary 
because tort law itself can provide a solution to the efficiency problems 
described by law and economics scholars.90 For example, the tort 
defense of assumption of risk—like contractual waivers of liability, 
typically rejected by courts in medical malpractice cases—could serve to 
protect physicians while allowing patients to pursue their preferences.91 
The scholarly debate about whether tort, fiduciary, or contract 
principles should govern medical liability continues to this day. 
Nevertheless, American common law has not kept pace.92 As described 
                                                     
87. Epstein, supra note 75, at 103 (acknowledging that “the requirement of reasonable care, as 
elaborated in traditional negligence cases, is a fair implication of the terms on which the [doctor-
patient] relationship is premised”); Havighurst, Standard of Care, supra note 80, at 270 (suggesting 
that courts may view agreements to modify the standard of care as violating public policy, but 
offering drafting suggestions for avoiding charges of unconscionability). 
88. See Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma, supra note 80, at 165 (noting that broad 
exculpatory clauses might be “too much for most courts to handle”). 
89. Maxwell Mehlman, for example, has proposed a model of “fiduciary contracting” to be used 
in the health care context, which would require proof that the conditions for efficient contracting—
information and choice—have been satisfied. See generally Mehlman, supra note 7; see also Mark 
Hall, The Legal and Historical Foundations of Patients as Medical Consumers, 96 GEO. L.J. 583, 
591–97 (2008) (noting that while health care law has “conventional contractual foundations,” it also 
deviates from traditional contract principles in ways that reflect the unique relationship between 
health care provider and patient); Hall & Schneider, supra note 7, at 775 (noting that “fiduciary 
principles strongly influence how contract principles apply to medical decisions”); Laakmann, 
supra note 8, at 965–66 (arguing that in the medical context, “law should distinguish between non-
negotiable fiduciary duties and duties that may be contractually modified by the parties”); 
Mehlman, supra note 7, at 366–67 (criticizing the Chicago school for neglecting to consider 
fiduciary aspects in their contracting arguments). 
90. Jennifer Arlen, Private Contractual Alternatives to Malpractice Liability, in MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE AND THE US HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 245, 257 (2006) (arguing that contract law 
solutions do not offer patients the same benefit as tort law); Patrick S. Atiyah, Medical Malpractice 
and the Contract/Tort Boundary, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 287, 287 (1986) (arguing that the 
solution is to change tort law, not move to contract). 
91. Nelson, supra note 4, at 791; see generally Laakmann, supra note 8. 
92. Schuck, supra note 4, at 908 (“Tort law has largely eclipsed consent-contract approaches to 
the problem of health-care-related injuries.”). 
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below, courts are still quite resistant to any attempt by providers to 
minimize their liability on the basis of a patient’s voluntary agreement, 
or to modify the default rules of the doctor-patient relationship by way 
of contractual agreement.93 
II. COMMON LAW APPROACHES TO PHYSICIAN LIABILITY 
As described above, the shift towards a consumerist model of health 
care led some legal scholars to argue that, just as patient preferences 
now drive treatment decisions, those preferences should also drive the 
law’s approach to recovery. Nevertheless, many courts continued to bar 
the use of both contract- and tort-based defenses based on a patient’s 
decision to proceed with treatment under conditions agreed to with the 
provider. Under common law, physicians are expected to prioritize the 
interests of their patients and satisfy professional standards of care, and 
courts are generally unwilling to allow physicians to defend themselves 
in malpractice cases on the basis of a contractual agreement with the 
patient. So, too, are courts generally hostile to the tort defense of 
assumption of risk, which relieves a physician of liability if a patient 
voluntarily (but non-contractually) chooses to encounter a known risk. 
This Part explains how contractual waivers of liability and the tort 
doctrine of assumption of risk can be used by health care providers to 
limit liability in medical malpractice actions, and describes courts’ 
traditional resistance to the use of such defenses. It also provides a 
comprehensive overview of the many cases in which courts have been 
receptive to such defenses, setting the foundation for Part III’s 
discussion of how the use of these defenses could be expanded to a 
broader variety of contexts. 
A. Contract and Tort Defenses Based on Voluntary Acceptance of 
Risk 
When a physician charged with malpractice wishes to defend himself 
on the grounds of a patient’s voluntary acceptance of risk, he may rely 
on either contract- or tort-based defenses. If the patient has signed a 
waiver, release of liability, or covenant not to sue, the defendant 
physician may point to that contractual agreement in an attempt to bar 
suit. If there has been no explicit contractual agreement to relieve the 
physician from liability, the physician may be able to rely on the tort 
doctrine of assumption of risk to bar or reduce recovery if he can prove 
                                                     
93. Id. at 911–12. 
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that the patient voluntarily chose to encounter a known risk. Whether 
grounded in contract or in tort, both defenses are premised on a patient’s 
voluntary choice to encounter a known risk. 
1. Contractual Release of Liability 
While tort law establishes a set of default principles defining general 
duties of care, contract law is the mechanism by which parties entering 
into an intentional relationship can define the scope of their duties more 
narrowly or more broadly. A contract may even release one party from 
the duty to exercise due care entirely,94 leaving the second party with no 
remedy for some types of injuries.95 
Contractual provisions that prospectively limit future liability for 
negligent conduct are strictly construed.96 For such exculpatory clauses 
to be enforceable, their language must clearly and unambiguously 
describe the scope of the waiver of liability, such that the party waiving 
his rights is able to understand the rights he is giving up.97 Even if these 
requirements are satisfied, however, a waiver may still be unenforceable 
if it violates public policy or affects the public interest,98 which is 
particularly relevant in cases dealing with medical services.99 
A defendant sued for negligence can therefore raise, as a defense, the 
plaintiff’s contractual agreement to relieve him from liability for 
                                                     
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 
2000) (“The essential element of a contractual limitation on liability is that each party agrees that 
the defendant is under no obligation to protect the plaintiff and shall not be liable to the plaintiff for 
the consequences of conduct that would otherwise be tortious.”). 
95. Such contractual provisions may be referred to as releases, waivers, covenants not to sue, or 
exculpatory clauses, depending on whether the parties are contracting about an existing claim or 
about future conduct. That said, there is widespread agreement that these terms are imprecise, often 
overlap, and are frequently misused. See, e.g., 17A AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 275 (2017) (noting the 
various terms used to describe contractual agreements to exempt one party from future liability to 
another); WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 419 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 
3d ed. 1919) (“The term waiver is one of those words of indefinite connotation in which our legal 
literature abounds; like a cloak, it covers a multitude of sins.”). For reasons of simplicity, this 
Article will primarily use the term “waiver” to describe such prospective contractual waivers of 
liability. 
96. 17A AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 276; 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:21 (4th ed. 2017); see 
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d. 
97. 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 96, §§ 19:21, 19:25. 
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); 8 WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS, supra note 96, §§ 19:22, 19:23; see also Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 
441 (Cal. 1963). 
99. See infra section II.B. 
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negligent conduct. If this contractual agreement is deemed to be 
enforceable, the plaintiff’s negligence claim will be dismissed. 
2. Express Assumption of Risk 
Express assumption of risk is a tort law defense that overlaps 
considerably with the contract defenses described above.100 A plaintiff 
expressly assumes a risk when she explicitly (verbally or in writing) 
agrees to accept a known risk of harm arising from a defendant’s 
conduct.101 Like contractual waiver, express assumption of risk is 
commonly viewed as either an agreement to release the defendant from 
an existing duty of care,102 or an agreement not to sue the defendant for 
injuries resulting from negligent conduct.103 It is treated as a form of 
contract, and so is typically subject to the same requirements as the 
contractual limitations on liability described above.104 The consequence 
of a finding of express assumption of risk is a complete bar on recovery 
by the plaintiff.105 
3. Implied Assumption of Risk 
Implied assumption of risk describes a scenario where a plaintiff’s 
conduct (rather than her explicit verbal or written agreement) indicates 
that she is choosing to voluntarily encounter a known risk. In such cases, 
                                                     
100. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 233 (2d ed. 2016) (“Any assumption of risk in 
its express form is a contract, and is thus subject to the laws of contract enforceability and 
interpretation.”). That said, some courts appear to draw a distinction between contractual waivers 
and express assumption of risk, holding that express assumption of risk may be a viable defense 
even if the contractual waiver the plaintiff signed was unenforceable. See, e.g., Poag v. Atkins, 806 
N.Y.S.2d 448 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (describing an exculpatory clause contained in a consent form as 
invalid on policy grounds, but holding there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
patient expressly assumed the risks of medical treatment when she signed the consent form); 
Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that the covenant not to sue in a consent 
form signed by the patient was unenforceable due to lack of precision, but that the consent form 
constituted sufficient evidence to allow a jury to consider express assumption of risk as a defense). 
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (AM. LAW INST. 1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2; DOBBS ET AL., supra note 100, § 232. 
102. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 100, § 232. 
103. Id. § 233. 
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2; DOBBS ET AL., supra note 100, § 233. 
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 (also noting that 
express assumption of risk survives the adoption of comparative negligence). 
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the plaintiff’s ability to recover in tort is limited, much in the same way 
as if the plaintiff were found comparatively negligent.106 
Regrettably, many courts appear to struggle with the distinctions 
between the two categories of implied assumption of risk described 
below.107 Commentators have described the doctrine of implied 
assumption of risk as “superfluous and unnecessarily confusing,”108 
Nevertheless, this Article continues to use the language of implied 
assumption of risk, in part because of the author’s belief that this 
categorization is valuable,109 and also because many of the judicial 
opinions discussed herein rely on the traditional definitions and 
categorizations of assumption of risk. 
a. Primary 
Primary implied assumption of risk—a complete bar to recovery—is 
best understood not as a defense, but rather as a failure of the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case for negligence.110 When a defendant raises this 
“defense,” he typically argues that the plaintiff was injured not as a 
result of a breach of duty by the defendant, but as a result of a risk 
inherent in an activity the plaintiff voluntarily chose to participate in.111 
                                                     
106. Many jurisdictions have officially “merged” the implied assumption of risk defense into 
comparative negligence. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 100, § 237. The Third Restatement of Torts has 
abandoned the doctrine as well. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY 
§ 2 cmt. i. 
107. Dale L. Moore, Please Watch Your Language: The Chronic Problem of Assumption of Risk, 
61 CATH. U. L. REV. 175, 184 (2011) (“[C]areless language pervades these opinions, revealing 
either ignorance of or indifference to the analytical nuances particularly important in [precedential 
cases].”). 
108. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 100, § 237. 
109. For an excellent analysis of the value of these categorizations, see Kenneth W. Simons, 
Reflections on Assumption of Risk, 50 UCLA L. REV. 481 (2002). 
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 reporters’ note cmt j; 
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 100, § 237 (“[A] plaintiff’s apparent consent is . . . ample ground for 
concluding that the defendant’s duty is limited or that the defendant is simply not negligent at all.”). 
Some commentators describe primary implied assumption of risk cases as those in which the 
plaintiff has failed to show a breach of duty on the part of the defendant; others have suggested that 
primary implied assumption of risk can describe cases where a plaintiff’s conduct effectively 
relieves the defendant of the duty to protect a plaintiff from the inherent risks of an activity. 3 STEIN 
ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 14:14 (3d ed. 1997) (in describing implied primary assumption 
of risk, noting that “voluntarily entering into a relationship with the defendant, and being fully 
aware that the defendant will not be responsible for protecting him or her from known future risks, 
the plaintiff impliedly relieves the defendant of any duty and agrees to accept the consequences”); 
cf. Moore, supra note 107, at 188–89 (noting that primary assumption of risk does not relieve a 
defendant of a duty; rather, either the duty does not exist in the first place, or it was not breached). 
111. Inherent risks are ones that “cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of 
the activity.” Beninati v. Black Rock City, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 105, 109 (Ct. App. 2009) (affirming 
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The most common cases of primary assumption of risk involve plaintiffs 
who voluntarily choose to engage in inherently dangerous recreational 
activities (like skiing or skydiving) and suffer injuries caused by the 
risks inherent in those activities. 
In the medical context, an example of primary implied assumption of 
risk would be a patient whose physician prescribes a medication and 
explains that its potential side effects include nausea and vomiting. If the 
patient takes the medication with knowledge of its risks and ultimately 
suffers nausea and vomiting, she can be described as having impliedly 
assumed the risk of side effects from the medication.112 Unless she can 
demonstrate that her physician was negligent in prescribing the 
medication or in describing its side effects, she will not be able to 
recover damages if she suffers nausea or vomiting. In effect, the 
physician’s satisfaction of his legal duty to obtain informed consent 
operates as a “defense” to any claim by the plaintiff that the physician 
should be liable for her injuries.113 
b. Secondary 
Secondary implied assumption of risk, in contrast, is a true defense, 
raised after a plaintiff has made credible allegations of a defendant’s 
breach of duty. When a defendant raises this defense, he argues that 
although the plaintiff may have been injured as a result of the 
defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff’s recovery should be reduced 
because he was aware of the defendant’s negligence and voluntarily 
chose to encounter it.114 
Proving secondary assumption of risk can be quite challenging 
because it is uncommon to find a plaintiff who is fully aware of the risk 
arising from a defendant’s breach, but who nevertheless chooses to 
                                                     
summary judgment against promoters of the Burning Man festival when the plaintiff, an attendee, 
sued for negligence when he suffered serious burns after falling into the burning remnants of the 
Man). They generally do not include the risk of negligence by a defendant offering the activity, or 
other “extraneous risks that can be avoided with reasonable care.” DOBBS ET AL., supra note 100, 
§ 237. 
112. Moore, supra note 107, at 193–95; see also Owens v. Silvia, 838 A.2d 881, 903 (R.I. 2003) 
(affirming trial court’s decision to introduce a consent form into evidence to show that plaintiff 
assumed the risks of certain injuries inherent in a surgical procedure, and that those injuries were 
caused not by negligence but “because such injuries occurred as part of the normal risks of 
undergoing this type of surgery”). 
113. MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 431–32 (8th ed. 2013). 
114. See infra section IV.A.3 for further discussion regarding the nuances of this definition and 
the doctrinal uncertainty regarding what, precisely, the plaintiff must be aware of. 
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intentionally encounter that risk.115 In the medical context, notably, 
many instances of malpractice are unpredictable and unanticipated; thus, 
it would be difficult to prove that a plaintiff, in advance of proceeding 
with a treatment, was aware that the treating physician was or would be 
negligent. One example of a case in which this defense might be 
successful would be if a patient freely consented to receiving treatment 
from a physician who was quite obviously intoxicated.116 A second 
example—and one most relevant to the arguments raised in this 
Article—would be if a physician recommended a treatment that was 
outside the standard of care, and the patient nevertheless chose to pursue 
that treatment after being fully informed of its risks.117 
B. The Traditional Patient-Protective View 
Many courts reject such contract- and tort-based defenses on 
essentially paternalistic grounds. Indeed, the cases taking this view are 
so prominent—and so well represented in law school casebooks—that 
some commentators make the understandable mistake of believing that 
                                                     
115. In most cases, such a choice would be unreasonable, which is exactly why many view 
secondary assumption of risk as simply another type of comparative negligence. See 3 STEIN ON 
PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES, supra note 110, § 14:14 (“When the plaintiff unreasonably volunteers 
or chooses to encounter a known risk, he or she is assuming the risk in the secondary sense. This 
may result from plaintiff’s voluntary acceptance of an unreasonable risk, or from failing to exercise 
reasonable care to protect himself or herself after accepting a reasonable risk.”). This author 
believes, however, that treating secondary implied assumption of risk as equivalent to comparative 
negligence is misguided. Comparative negligence requires proof that a plaintiff unreasonably failed 
to take precautions against a foreseeable risk, and that this decision was the cause of the plaintiff’s 
injuries. While many instances of secondary assumption of risk also involve a plaintiff’s 
unreasonable acceptance of known risks, others may involve a perfectly reasonable decision to 
accept a known risk in which the plaintiff has no opportunity to take precautions. Such situations 
cannot be described as acts of comparative negligence on the part of the plaintiff. See Simons, supra 
note 109 (analyzing the merits of distinguishing between reasonable and unreasonable assumptions 
of risk). 
116. See, e.g., Champs v. Stone, 58 N.E.2d 803, 803 (Ohio Ct. App. 1944) (holding that a patient 
who consented to receiving injections from a physician whose “gross intoxication” was “apparent” 
was either contributorily negligent or assumed the risk of negligent care). 
117. Surprisingly, Dobbs views such a case as a “no breach” example of primary assumption of 
risk. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 100, § 237 (describing an alternative therapy case as one where the 
physician “undoubtedly owes his patient a duty of reasonable care,” but breaches no duty when he 
“administer[s] only the care to which the patient consented,” and noting that “the physician would 
violate the patient’s rights if he administered a traditional treatment after agreeing not to”); id. at 
§ 232 (describing a Jehovah’s Witness case as one where “the physician owed the patient a duty of 
care but in fact exercised the appropriate care under the circumstances,” on the grounds that the 
physician “would violate the patient’s rights if he administered transfusions after agreeing not to do 
so”). For an explanation of why this interpretation is problematic, see section II.C.2. 
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these cases represent the entirety of common law’s treatment of this 
issue. 
The classic case rejecting contractual releases from liability in the 
medical context is Tunkl v. Regents of University of California.118 In 
Tunkl, a patient seeking admission to a charitable research hospital was 
asked, as a condition of admission, to sign a document purporting to 
release the hospital from liability for the negligent acts of its 
employees.119 The California Supreme Court held that because an 
exculpatory agreement between a hospital and a patient affects the 
public interest, it is unenforceable on policy grounds.120 The Court 
carefully analyzed a variety of elements relevant to the question of 
whether a contract affects the public interest,121 and found that the 
hospital-patient contract clearly satisfies them. Courts in many 
jurisdictions have relied upon the reasoning set forth in Tunkl to 
conclude that health care providers, including physicians,122 cannot 
contract their way out of liability for negligence.123 Where no contractual 
release exists, and physician defendants instead rely on implied 
                                                     
118. 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). 
119. Id. at 441. 
120. Id. at 447. 
121. A contract affecting the public interest, according to the Tunkl court, “exhibits some or all of 
the following characteristics”:  
It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. The party 
seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, 
which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public. The party holds 
himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at 
least for any member coming within certain established standards. As a result of the essential 
nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation 
possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who 
seeks his services. In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public 
with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a 
purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. Finally, 
as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under the control 
of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.   
Id. at 445–46. 
122. See, e.g., Belshaw v. Feinstein, 65 Cal. Rptr. 788 (Ct. App. 1968) (extending Tunkl’s public 
interest reasoning to contracts between patients and physicians). 
123. See, e.g., Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 275 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980), aff’d, 282 
S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1981); Meiman v. Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1969); Cudnik v. William 
Beaumont Hosp., 525 N.W.2d 891 (Mich. App. 1994); Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 
308 (App. Div. 1990); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977); see also A. M. Swarthout, 
Annotation, Validity and Construction of Contract Exempting Hospital or Doctor from Liability for 
Negligence to Patient, 6 A.L.R. 3d 704 (1966) (noting that rulings as to the validity of exculpatory 
contracts between hospitals or physicians and patients “indicate generally, but not uniformly, that 
contracts of the kind mentioned are invalid”). 
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assumption of risk defenses, courts likewise generally reject these 
defenses on similar policy grounds.124 
Critics correctly note that courts that reject contractual and tort-based 
defenses in medical malpractice cases “have not always provided a clear 
basis for their objections.”125 Mehlman, for example, argues that there 
has been “no consistency in the rationales offered by the courts, little 
practical guidance for future cases, and no way to distinguish cases that 
have invalidated such agreements as a matter of law from those that have 
upheld them or permitted their validity to be decided by a jury.”126 
Others point out that even applying the clearly described Tunkl factors 
does not necessarily support the outcomes in many medical malpractice 
cases.127 However, a careful analysis of case law demonstrates that the 
objections raised to defenses based on a patient’s voluntary acceptance 
of risk fall into three general categories: those concerning the 
unwaivable nature of the duties owed by physicians, concerns about 
freedom of choice and disparities in bargaining power, and concerns 
about informational disparities.128 
1. Unwaivable Duties 
Many courts, in rejecting these defenses in malpractice cases against 
individual health care providers, conclude that the duty of health care 
professionals to provide non-negligent medical care is one that simply 
cannot be waived, whether by way of contract or by a patient’s implicit 
                                                     
124. See, e.g., Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 567–68 (D.C. 1979) (holding that the trial 
court erred in allowing the jury to consider assumption of risk, noting that assumption of risk 
defenses have “rarely been sustained in actions involving professional negligence,” for reasons 
including the knowledge disparity between doctor and patient, and the “greater duty” owed by 
physicians to patients); Storm v. NSL Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d. 874, 886–87 (Del. Super. Ct. 
2005) (applying Tunkl factors and finding that “primary assumption of risk” is not applicable in 
health care contexts because patients do not choose to be in need of medical care and because 
healthcare regulations prohibit patients from permitting providers to exercise less than ordinary 
care); Brady v. Urbas, 111 A.3d 1155 (Pa. 2015) (same).  
125. Mehlman, supra note 75, at 357. 
126. Mehlman, supra note 7, at 401. 
127. Id. at 401–02; Mehlman, supra note 75, at 357 (noting that the Tunkl analysis “has been 
criticized as unpersuasive, incomplete, and inoperative”); Robinson, supra note 76, at 184. 
128. The discussion below expands on Max Mehlman’s excellent analysis in Fiduciary 
Contracting, in which he recognizes two of these categories—lack of choice and lack of 
information—and argues that they justify the outcomes in cases like Schneider, Colton, 
Porubiansky, and others. See generally Mehlman, supra note 7; see also Mehlman, supra note 75, at 
357–59 (noting that the “latent explanation” courts offer for the outcomes in these cases is that 
contracts between physicians and patients are inefficient due to unequal bargaining power, 
incomplete information, and lack of meaningful alternatives). 
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agreement. As stated by the Delaware Superior Court in Storm v. NSL 
Rockland Place, LLC,129 given the “strict legal, ethical, and professional 
standards that regulate the healthcare profession,” there is “virtually no 
scenario in which a patient can consent to allow a healthcare provider to 
exercise less than ‘ordinary care’ in the provision of services.”130 
Some courts ground this duty in state laws of professional licensure, 
which grant health care providers licenses to practice on the condition 
that they satisfy the professional standards of care. In Emory University 
v. Porubiansky,131 for example, the Georgia Supreme Court found that 
the physician’s duty to exercise reasonable care is “an affirmative 
statutory duty imposed upon those who engage in professional 
practice.”132 Courts in Tennessee, New York, and Washington have 
offered similar justifications for rejecting defenses that would effectively 
eliminate the physician’s duty to satisfy the standard of care.133 
Other courts note that the duty to exercise due care is established in 
the common law of tort and reinforced by malpractice law, and therefore 
cannot be relieved by any contractual or consent-based agreement.134 In 
                                                     
129. 898 A.2d 874 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005). 
130. Id. at 874. In Storm, the court rejected what it termed the “primary assumption of risk” 
defense in a claim alleging substandard medical care. However, it held that the defendants could 
raise the defense of “secondary assumption of risk” in its efforts to prove that the plaintiff’s conduct 
constituted contributory negligence. As explained in section II.A.3, however, the claim that a 
plaintiff has consented to substandard care is more accurately defined as secondary, not primary 
assumption of risk, so the court’s choice of language is perplexing. 
131. 282 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1981). 
132. Id. at 905. 
133. See, e.g., Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310–11 (App. Div. 1990) 
(noting that the state “carefully regulates the licensing of physicians and other health care 
professionals and monitors such activities to prevent untoward consequences to the public from ‘the 
ministrations of incompetent, incapable, ignorant persons’”); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 
432 (Tenn. 1977) (“We do not approve the procurement of a license to commit negligence in 
professional practice.”); Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 502, 219 P.2d 79, 90 (1950) (holding 
that state licensing statutes, which are intended to protect patients from incompetent practitioners, 
are “incompatible with putting the individual to the hazard of risking incompetence in the selection 
of persons to treat him”). 
134. See, e.g., Storm, 898 A.2d at 874 (noting that the assumption of risk defense is incompatible 
with state medical malpractice law and nursing home regulations); Spar v. Cha, 907 N.E.2d 974, 
979 (Ind. 2009) (“The duty of a treating physician is ordinarily to deliver medical services that meet 
the standard of ordinary care.”); Ash, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 311 (noting that “concern for the enforcement 
of established minimum standards of professional care provides the underlying rationale for a cause 
of action for malpractice in favor of those who have been subjected to substandard care”); Conrad-
Hutsell v. Colturi, No. L-01-1227, 2002 WL 1290844, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. May 24, 2002) 
(rejecting no-duty primary assumption of risk as a defense, holding that a patient’s decision to 
exceed the physician’s recommendation regarding narcotic dosage does not relieve the physician of 
a duty to monitor the patient for drug abuse, and finding that such an outcome would be “against 
public policy and render[] meaningless a physician’s statutory obligations to his patients”); Brady v. 
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Schwartz v. Johnson,135 for example, a Maryland appellate court denied 
a physician’s attempt to raise assumption of risk as a defense, holding 
that allowing this defense “would mean that [the patient] consented to 
allow [the physician] to exercise less than ordinary care.”136 It concluded 
that a patient’s consent to treatment cannot be used to “relieve the 
physician of compliance with the applicable standard of care.”137 Other 
courts have been even firmer in reaching this conclusion. The Fifth 
Circuit in Kozan v. Comstock,138 applying Louisiana law in a medical 
malpractice case, concluded that “[t]he duty of due care is imposed by 
law and is something over and above any contractual duty. Certainly, a 
physician could not avoid liability for negligent conduct by having 
contracted not to be liable for negligence. The duty is owed in all cases, 
and a breach of this duty constitutes a tort.”139 
Finally, other courts frame the physician’s unwaivable duty as 
effectively fiduciary in nature, grounded in professional ethics and the 
unique power relationship between physician and patient.140 In Ash v. 
New York University Dental Center,141 for example, a New York 
appellate court rejected a contractual waiver of liability in a malpractice 
case on public policy grounds. It noted that physicians owe “independent 
obligations” to patients based on their special relationship, one that 
“imposes upon the health care provider greater responsibilities than that 
required in the ordinary commercial market place.”142 Courts in many 
contexts have described the doctor-patient relationship as being 
                                                     
Urbas, A.3d 1155, 1162 (Pa. 2015) (“There is no assumption-of-the-risk defense available to a 
defendant physician which would vitiate his duty to provide treatment according to the ordinary 
standard of care.”). 
135. 49 A.3d 359 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012). 
136. Id. at 373. 
137. Id. 
138. 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959). 
139. Id. at 845. 
140. See, e.g., Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 568 (D.C. 1979) (holding that “the nature 
of the doctor-patient relationship, which requires the patient to rely on the learning and judgment of 
the doctors, often precludes a finding that the doctor owed no duty to the patient,” and that “the 
doctor generally owes a greater duty to his patient than the patient owes to himself”); Storm v. NSL 
Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d 874, 884 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005) (holding that given the “strict legal, 
ethical, and professional standards that regulate the healthcare profession,” there is “virtually no 
scenario in which a patient can consent to allow a healthcare provider to exercise less than ‘ordinary 
care’ in the provision of services”); Rosenthal v. Bologna, 620 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (App. Div. 1995) 
(rejecting liability waiver between patient and home health service provider, citing the “State’s 
interest in the health and welfare of its citizens” and the “highly dependent (and thus unequal) 
relationship between patient and health care provider”). 
141. 564 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 1990). 
142. Id. at 311. 
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grounded in fiduciary principles, imposing additional duties on 
physicians for the protection of patients from abuse of power.143 
While, in reaching these conclusions, some courts reference the 
experimental or alternative therapy cases described in section II.C as 
exceptions to this general rule, they offer no satisfactory explanations for 
why these exceptions are justifiable.144 
2. Freedom of Choice and Disparities in Bargaining Power 
Multiple factors cited in Tunkl to justify a public policy exception to 
enforcement of liability waivers speak to the patient’s lack of bargaining 
power when seeking out medical treatment; many other courts have 
raised similar concerns. As the California Supreme Court wrote in Tunkl, 
patients seeking medical services are “in special need of the particular 
skill of [a hospital’s] staff and facilities,” and the provision of these 
services constitutes a “practical and crucial necessity” for patients.145 
Consequently, “[t]he would-be patient is in no position to reject the 
proffered agreement, to bargain with the hospital, or in lieu of agreement 
to find another hospital.”146 Courts considering assumption of risk 
defenses have raised similar concerns about the patient’s lack of choice 
in the matter of whether to seek medical care, noting that unlike in other 
commercial transactions where assumption of risk may be used as a 
valid defense, a patient has little choice in pursuing treatment—she does 
so not “out of a desire to satisfy a personal preference,”147 but out of 
medical necessity. 
                                                     
143. See Hall, supra note 89, at 593 (citing case law holding that “physicians owe fiduciary-like 
duties to their patients”); Mehlman, supra note 7, at 388–90 (citing case law describing the 
physician-patient relationship as fiduciary in nature). 
144. Spar v. Cha, 907 N.E.2d 974, 982 n.2 (Ind. 2009) (identifying, in a footnote, alternative 
therapy and Jehovah’s Witness cases as “exceptional circumstance[s]” where assumption of risk can 
apply because “the patient’s express refusal ahead of time relieves the physician of this duty”); 
Schwartz v. Johnson, 49 A.3d 359, 371 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (citing cases of alternative 
therapy and patients’ refusal to follow physician recommendations as ones where assumption of risk 
would be appropriate, but concluding that a patient will “almost never” voluntarily accept the risk 
that a physician will negligently perform a procedure). 
145. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 447 (Cal. 1963). 
146. Id.; see also Rosenthal v. Bologna, 620 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (App. Div. 1995) (rejecting 
liability waiver between patient and home health service provider, citing the “highly dependent (and 
thus unequal) relationship between patient and health care provider”); Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental 
Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (App. Div. 1990) (in rejecting a liability waiver, noting that the 
inequality of bargaining power between patient and health care provider, where one party “must 
either accept what is offered or be deprived of the advantages of the relation,” creates a “substantial 
opportunity for abuse”). 
147. Storm v. NSL Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d 874, 883–84 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005); cf. id. at 
886 (noting that the question of whether a patient had sufficient bargaining power when signing a 
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Some courts, in pointing to the patient’s lack of bargaining power, 
also reference the potentially discriminatory and disparate impact that 
acceptance of such defenses might have on patients with limited 
resources. If physicians were permitted to rely on these defenses under 
ordinary circumstances, surely patients of financial means would attempt 
to negotiate to retain their right to sue for malpractice. Patients who lack 
the financial resources to negotiate with their providers, however, would 
find themselves without a remedy. As the court in Tunkl wrote, “[t]o 
immunize the hospital from negligence as to the charitable patient 
because he does not pay would be as abhorrent to medical ethics as it is 
to legal principle.”148 A later New York case, also dealing with a health 
care institution that served low-income clients, raised similar 
concerns.149 The New York court noted that patients who receive 
services at low-income dental clinics out of financial necessity “cannot 
be considered to have freely bargained for a sub-standard level of care in 
exchange for a financial savings.”150 Upholding exculpatory clauses, the 
court held, would lead to an “invidious result”—“a de facto system in 
which the medical services received by the less affluent are permitted to 
be governed by lesser minimal standards of care and skill than that 
received by other segments of society.”151 
3. Information Disparity 
Finally, many courts rejecting assumption of risk defenses in 
malpractice cases do so on the basis that assumption of risk requires a 
patient’s knowing appreciation of risk, and that the information disparity 
between doctor and patient necessarily makes this impossible.152 As 
                                                     
contractual exculpatory agreement is “not applicable in assessing whether a primary assumption of 
the risk defense violates public policy”). 
148. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 448. 
149. Ash, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 308.   
150. Id. at 371–72. 
151. Id. at 370. 
152. See, e.g., Storm, 898 A.2d at 884 (holding that the information disparity between doctor and 
patient precludes the use of assumption of risk as a defense, citing courts in other jurisdictions using 
similar reasoning); Spar v. Cha, 907 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 2009) (citing Storm and Morrison to this 
effect); Schwartz v. Johnson, 49 A.3d 359, 372 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (holding that “the very 
nature of actions involving medical malpractice,” in which there is a significant disparity in 
knowledge between doctor and patient, precludes the use of assumption of risk as a defense); see 
also Hardi v. Mezzanotte, 818 A.2d 974, 980 (D.C. 2003) (in ruling on a statute of limitations issue, 
holding that due to the information disparity between doctor and patient, “patient can not be 
expected to know that the doctor’s actions might be negligent and result in harm or to question 
them”). 
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noted in Morrison v. MacNamara,153 a case reversing a trial court’s 
decision to allow the jury to consider assumption of risk as a defense to 
medical malpractice, “the disparity in knowledge between professionals 
and their clientele generally precludes recipients of professional services 
from knowing whether a professional’s conduct is in fact negligent.”154 
In cases dealing with contractual defenses, in contrast, there is no 
requirement that a patient knowingly enter into a relationship that will 
involve negligent conduct. However, because understanding of the 
bargain struck is a necessary component of any enforceable exculpatory 
clause, some contractual waivers in the health care context have been 
struck down due to lack of clarity as to the terms of the agreement.155 
Such cases likewise reflect courts’ concerns about patients’ lack of 
information as compared to their health care providers, albeit here, legal 
information rather than medical information. 
C. Cases Limiting Physician Liability 
Despite the vigor with which many courts reject the notion that a 
patient may be deemed to have consented to negligent medical care, 
there are a few contexts in which courts have been willing to accept 
defenses based on a patient’s voluntary acceptance of risk. For the 
purposes of this Article, the two most relevant contexts involve 
experimental or alternative therapies, and surgical treatment constrained 
by Jehovah’s Witnesses’ beliefs regarding the use of blood products.156 
                                                     
153. 407 A.2d 555, 567 (D.C. 1979). 
154. Id.; see also Hall & Schneider, supra note 7, at 761 (“If courts rigorously apply informed-
consent law to assumption of risk, ‘[o]nly in rare circumstances would a patient be considered to 
have assumed the risk of negligent medical treatment’ because ‘most patients’ knowledge of 
medicine does not permit them to understand these risks.” (alteration in original) (quoting Murphy, 
infra note 156, at 162)). 
155. See, e.g., Abramowitz v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., Coll. of Dentistry, 494 N.Y.S.2d 721, 724 
(App. Div. 1985) (rejecting an exculpatory clause on the grounds that the contractual language did 
not “unmistakenly express an intention on the part of the plaintiff to absolve the defendant of 
liability for its own negligence”); Leidy v. Deseret Enters., Inc., 381 A.2d 164, 169 (Pa. 1977) 
(noting that plaintiff who suffered injury at a health spa should be able to present evidence as to 
whether she was “aware” that the exculpatory clause she signed would release the spa and its 
employees (including physicians and physical therapists) from liability); Poag v. Atkins, 806 
N.Y.S.2d 448, 2005 WL 2219689, at *3 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 12, 2005) (unpublished table decision) 
(rejecting exculpatory agreement in a medical malpractice case because “no separate heading or 
caption was present to alert the decedent that she was foregoing the right to bring suit”). 
156. Similar defenses have also been raised by physician-defendants where a patient fails to 
follow medical advice, refuses recommended treatment, or makes misrepresentations that affect her 
medical care. See Sharon W. Murphy, Contributory Negligence in Medical Malpractice: Are the 
Standards Changing to Reflect Society’s Growing Health Care Consumerism?, 17 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 151, 167–72 (1991). These cases—in which a patient’s unreasonable conduct or lack of due 
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In the alternative therapy cases, patients argue that their health care 
providers deviated from the standard of care in offering the treatment in 
question—that is, even if the treatment was performed as intended, it fell 
outside the standard of care. Physicians in these cases defend themselves 
on the grounds that their patients freely and knowingly consented to an 
inherently risky treatment. In the Jehovah’s Witness cases, in contrast, 
patients typically allege that some unanticipated negligence occurred 
during the performance of surgery. The patients in these cases have 
previously consented to receiving surgical treatment without the use of 
blood or blood products, and their physicians claim that this consent 
relieves them of liability for injuries resulting from blood loss, even if 
that blood loss was occasioned by the physician’s unanticipated 
negligence.157 
In both contexts, courts have been receptive to physicians’ defensive 
arguments grounded in the patient’s implied or express acceptance of 
risk. However, the reasoning offered by courts in these cases is often 
quite underdeveloped. While some offer justifications for why 
physicians should not be liable for deviating from the standard of care in 
these contexts, many courts fail to acknowledge the patient-protective 
arguments described above in section II.B, and therefore fail to explain 
why these contexts justify a deviation from those traditional principles. 
1. Experimental or Alternative Therapies 
The first line of medical malpractice cases in which courts are willing 
to enforce waivers of liability and recognize assumption of risk as a 
defense involves experimental or alternative treatments. In such cases, a 
patient is offered the opportunity to receive a risky experimental or 
alternative therapy and chooses to proceed with full knowledge of the 
treatment’s risks, benefits, and alternatives.158 When the patient later 
sues the physician for malpractice, the physician may be permitted to 
defend herself on the grounds of the patient’s contractual waiver of 
                                                     
care contributed to her injury—are most often analyzed under the doctrine of comparative 
negligence, rather than assumption of risk. Id. There appears to be little, if any, concern that 
reduction of damages in these contexts is inappropriate. Moreover, they are distinguishable from the 
alternative therapy and Jehovah’s Witness contexts because they do not involve patients who 
voluntarily and knowingly agree to pursue potentially negligent treatment freely offered by 
physicians—rather, the patient’s unreasonable conduct in the comparative negligence cases is at 
odds with the physicians’ expectations or recommendations regarding treatment. 
157. See infra section II.C.2.  
158. But see infra note 163. 
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liability or implied assumption of risk.159 Typically, in these cases, there 
is no allegation that the physician performed a treatment negligently. 
Rather, the allegation is that the physician’s selection and 
recommendation of the treatment was negligent—in other words, that 
the treatment itself was so far outside the standard of care that it would 
constitute malpractice even if performed as intended.160 
For example, a series of New York cases involved patients suffering 
from cancer who sought treatment from physicians offering alternatives 
to radiation and chemotherapy.161 Some of the physicians informed their 
patients that the treatments were experimental, or not guaranteed to be 
effective.162 However, others did not disclose the experimental nature of 
the treatments, or claimed unreasonable success rates.163 Nevertheless, in 
all four cases, courts allowed the defendant physicians to argue that their 
patients’ recovery should be reduced or barred entirely because they 
voluntarily assumed the risk of treatment with full knowledge of its risks 
and benefits.164 In two of these cases, where the patients had signed 
                                                     
159. See generally LUCINDA JESSON & STACEY TOVINO, COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE 
MEDICINE AND THE LAW 152–56 (2010) (discussing the assumption of risk defense in the context of 
alternative medicine). 
160. See, e.g., Charell v. Gonzalez, 660 N.Y.S.2d 665, 665 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (noting that a 
treatment described as “‘non-conventional’ may well necessitate a finding that the doctor who 
practices such medicine deviates from ‘accepted’ medical standards”); Colton v. N.Y. Hosp., 414 
N.Y.S.2d 866, 876 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (describing the experimental treatment in question as one that 
“because of its inherent dangers, may ordinarily be in and of itself a departure from customary and 
accepted practice (and thus possibly actionable as malpractice) even if performed in a non-negligent 
manner”).  
161. Boyle v. Revici, 961 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1992); Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 
1987); Charell v. Gonzalez, 673 N.Y.S.2d 685 (App. Div. 1998); Poag v. Atkins, 806 N.Y.S.2d 448, 
2005 WL 2219689 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 12, 2005) (unpublished table decision). 
162. Boyle, 961 F.2d at 1062 (the patient was informed that the medications used were not FDA 
approved, and that the physician “could offer no guarantees”); Schneider, 817 F.2d at 989 (the 
consent form stated the patient’s understanding that “some of the treatment procedures and 
medications are still investigatory awaiting further research and submission for F.D.A. approval”). 
163. In Charell, the patient also brought suit for lack of informed consent, claiming the physician 
told her that his treatment had a 75% success rate and failed to provide her with information about 
the risks of treatment. Nevertheless, the court found that while there was evidence to support a 
finding of lack of informed consent, there was also evidence to support a finding that the patient had 
sufficient knowledge of the risks of treatment from sources other than her physician, and so could 
be found to have impliedly assumed the risk of treatment. Charell, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 665. In Poag, 
the physician allegedly told the patient that the alternative treatment could “definitely cure” her 
breast cancer; the court nevertheless concluded that there was a triable issue of fact as to what risks 
the plaintiff was actually informed of and whether she impliedly assumed these risks. Poag, 806 
N.Y.S.2d, 2005 WL 2219689, at *1, *3.  
164. Boyle, 961 F.2d at 1061–62 (reversing trial court’s rejection of jury instructions on express 
assumption of risk, despite the absence of a signed consent form); Schneider, 817 F.2d at 996 
(reversing trial court’s rejection of jury instructions on express assumption of risk, finding that there 
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consent forms purporting to release their physicians from liability, the 
courts held that the contractual waivers were unenforceable, but 
nevertheless allowed the juries to consider express assumption of risk as 
a defense.165 
Surprisingly, some of the opinions upholding assumption of risk and 
contractual waivers as defenses in alternative therapy cases do not 
acknowledge that courts have traditionally rejected these defenses in 
medical malpractice contexts.166 And as compared to the many cases in 
which assumption of risk and waiver defenses have been rejected after 
extensive analysis of policy arguments, the reasoning in these opinions 
seems quite underdeveloped. Courts that support express or implied 
assumption of risk defenses in experimental or alternative therapy cases 
justify their holdings quite simply by pointing to the societal value of 
allowing informed patients to pursue innovative treatments that fall 
outside the standard of care. However, these courts offer no clear 
guidance as to where one might draw the line between permissible and 
impermissible deviations from the standard of care. 
Colton v. New York Hospital167 is one example of a case where the 
court justified its holding by reference to the societal value of the 
treatment in question. In Colton, two patients were injured as a result of 
an experimental kidney transplant procedure that the court described as 
being so inherently dangerous that it might “ordinarily be in and of itself 
a departure from customary and accepted practice (and thus possibly 
                                                     
was sufficient evidence to present the issue to the jury; but upholding court’s refusal to submit 
consent form to the jury on the grounds that the form was not an unequivocal release of liability); 
Charell, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 686–87 (refusing to vacate jury finding that patient impliedly assumed the 
risk of treatment); Poag, 806 N.Y.S.2d, 2005 WL 2219689, at *3 (denying motions for summary 
judgment so that express assumption of risk defense, based on patient’s signature on informed 
consent form, could be presented at trial; but finding that the exculpatory agreement in the consent 
form signed by the patient was unenforceable as violating public policy). 
165. In Schneider, this outcome was understandable—the court found that the consent form 
signed by the patient did not unequivocally release the doctor from liability and so was not 
enforceable as a matter of contract, but that it could be used as evidence to support the assertion that 
the patient voluntarily, knowingly, and explicitly assumed the risk of treatment. Schneider, 817 F.2d 
at 993, 996. In Poag, however, the court’s conclusion is somewhat perplexing—it denied the 
physician’s contractual defense on the grounds that releases from medical malpractice are against 
public policy, but nevertheless permitted the defendants to make the same argument as a matter of 
tort law via the doctrine of express assumption of risk. Poag, 806 N.Y.S.2d, 2005 WL 2219689, at 
*3. It is unclear why, if barring a patient’s right to sue for medical malpractice violates public policy 
when the patient signs a document to that effect, those same policy reasons would not cause the 
court to reject express assumption of risk (also a total bar on recovery) as a defense. 
166. But see Poag, 806 N.Y.S.2d, 2005 WL 2219689, at *3 (refusing to enforce exculpatory 
clause in a consent document on the grounds that policy reasons “typically” bar enforcement of such 
contractual agreements, but allowing express assumption of risk to be presented as a defense). 
167. 414 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. 1979). 
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actionable as malpractice) even if performed in a nonnegligent 
manner.”168 Nevertheless, the court held that when a patient voluntarily 
undergoes a risky procedure, the parties may covenant to release the 
physician from liability for proper performance of that procedure.169 It 
justified its conclusion by pointing to “public policy encouraging such 
necessary activity as experimental medical research,”170 and noted that 
this policy goal could not be achieved if patients were permitted to sue. 
It did not, however, address whether other policy goals might likewise 
be achieved by enforcing covenants not to sue in other medical contexts. 
And perhaps most strikingly, although the court cited Tunkl in its 
discussion of legal terminology,171 nowhere did it acknowledge the 
primary holding of the Tunkl decision or the implications of that 
decision—namely, that releases of liability for negligence by health care 
institutions and providers generally violate public policy. 
The court in Schneider v. Revici172 relied on similar reasoning when it 
allowed a jury to consider express assumption of risk in a case where a 
patient with breast cancer sought out non-invasive therapy that had not 
been adopted by the medical community.173 As in Colton, the allegations 
of malpractice in Schneider related to the provision of the alternative 
treatment itself—not any negligence in the administration or 
performance of that treatment. The court held that an informed decision 
to reject conventional cancer therapy and seek out alternative treatments 
is within the patient’s right “to determine what shall be done with his 
own body,” but offered no guidance as to whether there are any contexts 
in which this right of self-determination might justifiably be limited.174 
Unlike the court in Colton, it acknowledged the plaintiff’s argument that 
public policy generally opposes the use of assumption of risk to 
“dissolve the physician’s duty to treat a patient according to medical 
community standards,” but quickly dismissed that argument by pointing 
                                                     
168. Id. at 876. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 875 (The court specifically referenced New York legislation favoring kidney transplant 
programs, and federal and state subsidies of kidney transplants and experimental medical research 
programs. Note, however, that the kidney transplant at issue in this case was being provided for the 
purposes of clinical treatment, and not for research purposes). 
171. Id. at 964 (citing Tunkl in its discussion of the distinctions between waivers, releases, 
covenants not to sue, and exculpatory clauses). 
172. 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1987). 
173. Id. at 995.  
174. Id. 
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out that no such public policy had been statutorily enacted.175 The court 
ultimately concluded that there is no policy reason to prevent a patient 
from “go[ing] outside currently approved medical methods” in pursuit of 
treatment.176 
In Charell v. Gonzalez,177 the court recognized the defendant’s 
argument that the practice of alternative medicine would be chilled if the 
verdict against the physician were upheld.178 Unlike the court in 
Schneider, the Charell court did not explicitly opine on the value of 
alternative and experimental treatments such as the ones offered by the 
defendants. However, it seemed to acknowledge that refusing to 
recognize assumption of risk and waiver defenses would chill these 
practices, noting that the only way physicians could offer such a “non-
conventional” therapy is if their patient “execute[d] a comprehensive 
consent containing appropriate information as to the risks involved” that 
could then be relied upon as proof of the patient’s voluntary acceptance 
of specific risks.179 Like the court in Colton, it did not mention the 
traditional public policy objections to the enforcement of contractual 
waivers or the use of assumption of risk defenses in medical malpractice 
cases, and offered no indication of whether these defenses could be used 
beyond the context of alternative or experimental cancer treatment. 
In sum, the courts that have accepted claims that patients’ recovery 
for malpractice should be barred or limited if they knowingly chose to 
pursue risky experimental or alternative therapy have justified their 
decisions for reasons of public policy. They conclude that because there 
is value in medical experimentation, and because patients have the right 
to make medical decisions about their bodies, a patient’s agreement to 
pursue unconventional treatment can and should be viewed either as a 
decision to release the physician from the duty to provide standard 
medical care (barring recovery entirely) or as a justifiable reason to 
reduce recovery. These courts do not, however, explain why these policy 
arguments override the argument that the duties of care imposed on 
physicians by statute, common law, and professional ethics are 
                                                     
175. Id. (noting that under New York common law, waivers of liability do not violate public 
policy unless there are statutory limitations on such agreements (citing Arbegast v. Bd. of Educ., 65 
N.Y.2d 161, 170 (1985))). 
176. Schneider, 817 F.2d at 995; see also Boyle v. Revici, 961 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1992) (relying 
on the reasoning in Schneider). 
177. 660 N.Y.S.2d 665 (Sup. Ct. 1997). 
178. Id. at 668. 
179. Id. Interestingly, Charell was one of the cases in which the physician failed to inform the 
patient of the risks of treatment. See supra note 163. 
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fundamentally unwaivable.180 Moreover, these cases do not resolve the 
question of whether there are other contexts, beyond experimental or 
alternative therapy, in which public policy might support patients’ 
autonomous decisions to pursue treatment that falls outside the standard 
of care. 
2. Jehovah’s Witness Refusal of Blood 
The second category of malpractice cases in which courts regularly 
permit the use of voluntary acceptance of risk defenses involves 
Jehovah’s Witness patients whose religious beliefs prohibit the use of 
blood or blood products. Typically, these cases arise when a physician’s 
negligent performance of a surgical operation results in an injury that is 
exacerbated by the patient’s refusal to accept transfused blood. Most 
courts in these cases hold that while patients who refuse blood for 
religious reasons do not assume the risk of the physician’s negligence, 
they do assume the risk of harm resulting from refusal to accept blood.181 
The strongest policy justification that has been offered in support of 
this conclusion is that, in the absence of such liability protections, 
physicians would be unwilling to accept and treat Jehovah’s Witness 
patients.182 In Shorter v. Drury,183 the court described such an outcome 
as “repugnant in a society which attempts to make medical care 
available to all its members.”184 That said, many courts adjudicating 
Jehovah’s Witness cases permit defendants to present contractual or tort-
based defenses based on the patient’s voluntary acceptance of risk 
without considering policy justifications at all. Rather, they simply 
analyze these defenses as they would in any other tort action—by 
looking to whether the language in a signed release was specific 
enough,185 or referencing state constitutional provisions requiring jury 
                                                     
180. See supra section II.B.1. 
181. See cases cited infra, note 194. But see Garcia v. Edgewater Hosp., 613 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that signed release barred patient’s claim against the hospital for 
injuries resulting from implantation of a defective heart valve). 
182. Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 652–53, 695 P.2d 116, 120–21 (1985). 
183. 103 Wash. 2d 645, 695 P.2d 116 (1985). 
184. Id. at 652, 695 P.2d at 121. 
185. See, e.g., Garcia, 613 N.E.2d at 1251 (holding that release signed by Jehovah’s Witness 
patient barred suit as a matter of law, finding that there were no policy reasons to bar enforcement 
of the release, which “explicitly delineated the desires and intentions of both parties”); Corlett v. 
Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that release signed by Jehovah’s Witness 
patient did not bar malpractice suit, because the language of the release did not specifically relieve 
physician from liability for negligence in diagnosis and treatment). 
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determinations of assumption of risk.186 As with many of the 
experimental and alternative treatment cases, courts in blood refusal 
cases rarely acknowledge the traditional bar on assumption of risk and 
contractual waiver in medical malpractice cases, and offer little to no 
justification for their deviation from these traditional principles.187 In 
Garcia v. Edgewater Hospital,188 for example, the court recognized that 
“exculpatory contracts are not favored” and will not be enforced if they 
are “against public policy,” but ultimately concluded, without further 
analysis, that “there are no policy reasons which would indicate that the 
releases [signed by the Jehovah’s Witness plaintiff] should not be 
upheld.”189 
However, there are two peculiarities in these cases that distinguish 
them from the experimental and alternative therapy cases described 
above. First, unlike the experimental treatment cases, the plaintiffs in 
blood refusal cases are not explicitly alleging that surgery without the 
use of blood—that is, the offering of this type of treatment—in and of 
itself constitutes negligence. Rather, the alleged negligence involves 
unanticipated errors in the performance of the surgery. That said, there is 
no logical way to interpret these cases without conceding that the 
offering of bloodless surgery could constitute malpractice even in the 
absence of any errors in performance. Jehovah’s Witness patients are 
regularly asked to sign legal waivers in connection with their refusal of 
blood products, and at least one court has explicitly acknowledged that 
assumption of risk and waiver defenses are necessary to ensure that 
physicians who treat these patients are protected from liability.190 The 
necessary but unspoken underlying assumption, of course, is that 
physicians who perform surgery on Jehovah’s Witness patients in 
accordance with their religious limitations are at risk of being found 
negligent even if they perform the surgery with all due care—otherwise 
                                                     
186. Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., 9 P.3d 314 (Ariz. 2000) (finding that jury 
instructions defining the specific risks the plaintiffs did and did not assume violated Arizona 
constitutional requirement that defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk be left to 
the jury).  
187. Of the Jehovah’s Witness cases cited herein, only Shorter v. Drury explicitly references 
Tunkl and similar cases barring enforcement of releases in medical malpractice cases. Shorter, 103 
Wash. 2d at 652–53, 695 P.2d at 120–21. 
188. 613 N.E.2d 1243 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
189. Id. at 1251. 
190. Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 652–53, 695 P.2d at 120–21. That said, the court in Shorter 
seemed to be addressing the risk of liability if the physician were to administer blood against the 
patient’s wishes, and not liability for deviating from the standard of care. 
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there would be no need for such waivers.191 Surely, if an expert testified 
that performing a given surgical procedure without blood or blood 
products would, under ordinary circumstances, be negligent, a plaintiff’s 
attorney might successfully argue that the act constitutes malpractice 
regardless of the identity of the patient.192 While the development of 
“bloodless surgery” and its increased use by non-religious patients may 
make this argument more challenging to present,193 it seems to be an 
unstated presumption in Jehovah’s Witness cases that surgery without 
blood exposes physicians to liability risk for operating outside the 
standard of care. 
A second peculiar element of these cases is courts’ insistence that 
Jehovah’s Witness patients who sign releases of liability are only 
assuming the risks of harm associated with refusing blood and are not 
assuming the risks of physician negligence.194 Courts rely on this 
reasoning to permit malpractice suits against physicians to proceed, but 
then—curiously—nevertheless allow damages to be reduced. If the 
patient has not assumed the risk of physician negligence, then why is it 
justifiable to reduce her damages on assumption of risk grounds? 
                                                     
191. In this way, Jehovah’s Witness cases can be distinguished from more traditional cases of 
treatment refusal. Modern principles of law and medical ethics bar physicians (in all but the most 
exceptional circumstances) from providing treatment to an informed and competent patient who 
refuses treatment. In such cases, withholding unwanted treatment does not constitute malpractice; 
rather, it protects physicians from allegations of battery. However, there is a difference between 
merely withholding unwanted treatment while providing all other care in according with medical 
standards (for example, withholding unwanted dialysis from a dying patient but providing 
competent palliative care), and withholding unwanted treatment while instead actively providing 
risky treatment that falls outside the standard of care. 
192. The success of this argument would depend on the jury’s interpretation of medical custom 
and of the expectations of a reasonable physician acting “in like circumstances.” See supra section 
I.B. 
193. See Amanda Schaffer, Should Anyone Be Given a Blood Transfusion?, NEW YORKER (Aug. 
13, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/should-anyone-be-given-a-blood-trans 
fusion [https://perma.cc/28JQ-PX4C] (describing the development of bloodless surgery and 
research supporting its efficacy and safety). 
194. Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., 9 P.3d 314, 319 (Ariz. 2000) (rejecting trial 
court’s assumption of risk jury instruction on the grounds that jury was required to make these 
factual determinations, where jury instruction established that plaintiff “did not voluntarily assume 
the risk of negligence by the Defendants, but . . . did voluntarily assume the risks relating to the 
refusal to take or receive transfusions of blood or blood products”); Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 
257, 261 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that the release barred liability for negligence in respecting 
patient’s refusal of a blood transfusion, but did not bar liability for negligence in diagnosis and 
treatment of a medical condition, though plaintiff’s recovery could be reduced for failure to mitigate 
damages); Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 652–53, 695 P.2d at 124 (“Mr. and Mrs. Shorter did not assume 
the risk of the negligence. The risk they did assume was the risk of death as the consequence of their 
refusal to permit a blood transfusion.”). 
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Presumably, when courts distinguish between assuming the risk of 
negligence and assuming the risk of blood loss, what they really mean is 
that the patient has not relieved the physician of the duty to exercise due 
care in the performance of a medical procedure but has relieved the 
physician of the duty to administer blood in the event of medical 
necessity. In other words, a patient’s suit would be barred if it were 
predicated solely on the physician’s decision not to provide a blood 
transfusion, but the patient would still be permitted to sue if she alleged 
other negligent conduct on the part of the physician. In Garcia, for 
example, the court distinguished between cases alleging negligent 
diagnosis and treatment (which it stated would not be barred by a 
Jehovah’s Witness release), and cases “predicated upon the defendant 
doctor’s respect for the decedent’s refusal to transfuse blood.”195 And 
this distinction surely makes sense. A release of liability that relieves a 
physician of the duty to administer blood should not bar suit if the 
physician commits some other type of malpractice. But why, then, 
should assumption of risk doctrine reduce the Jehovah’s Witness 
patient’s damages at all? 
In Shorter, for example, the court held that the patient did not assume 
the risk of the “direct consequences” of the physician’s negligence, but 
did assume the risk of death as a consequence of refusing blood “under 
any circumstances including where the doctor made what would 
otherwise have been correctable surgical mistake.”196 As noted by the 
dissent, however, there is a substantial difference between assuming the 
risk of refusing blood in a procedure that is performed with due care, and 
assuming the risk of refusing blood “even when the blood was required 
because the doctor was negligent.”197 Treating the two as equivalent “in 
effect hold[s] that the [patient] assumed the risk of the doctor’s 
                                                     
195. Garcia v. Edgewater Hosp., 613 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). In light of the 
distinction drawn by the court, however, the outcome in Garcia is particularly perplexing. Garcia 
sued the hospital for breach of implied warranty of merchantability, alleging that the hospital’s use 
of a defective heart valve caused the patient’s heart surgery to take longer than expected, which in 
turn led to a clotting disorder and blood loss that caused the patient’s death. Id. at 1246–47. The 
court concluded that a release signed by the patient completely barred suit against the hospital. Id. at 
1250–51. The release noted that “unforeseen conditions” might arise during the procedure that 
would necessitate the use of blood, denied authorization for blood transfusion, and released the 
hospital and its physicians from liability “[i]n the event of my death as a result of not administering 
blood.” Id. However, the patient’s suit was explicitly predicated on the hospital’s breach of duty in 
providing a defective heart valve, and not its “respect for the decedent’s refusal to transfuse blood.” 
Id. at 1251. Accordingly, under the distinction drawn by the court in Garcia, the patient’s suit 
should not have been barred. 
196. Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 656, 695 P.2d at 123 (emphasis added). 
197. Id. at 660, 695 P.2d at 125 (Pearson, J., dissenting). 
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negligence.”198 The more reasonable interpretation of the patient’s 
refusal (and one that the plaintiffs in Shorter conceded was their 
understanding at the time they signed the refusal form) is that it 
“represents [only] their assent to relieve [the physician] of his duty to 
administer blood if required by the non-negligent performance of the 
procedure.”199 If a court’s finding that a Jehovah’s Witness patient who 
refuses blood has not assumed the risk of the physician’s negligence is to 
have any merit, then express or implied assumption of risk doctrine 
should not be used to reduce damages when the patient suffers injury 
resulting from such negligence.200 Of course, there may be other 
doctrines that would allow for a reduction in the patient’s recovery—for 
example, mitigation of damages.201 
In sum, the reasoning used by courts in Jehovah’s Witness blood 
refusal cases to justify enforcement of contractual releases or application 
of assumption of risk doctrine is puzzling. While their decisions are 
ostensibly justified on policy grounds—in an effort to ensure that 
Jehovah’s Witness patients are neither rejected by physicians nor forced 
into treatment that violates their religious beliefs202—most courts fail to 
explain why these policy justifications override the policy arguments 
noted in Tunkl and other cases.203 Moreover, courts’ insistence that 
Jehovah’s Witness patients are not assuming the risk of physician 
negligence seems inconsistent with their application of assumption of 
risk principles to reduce recovery when physicians are charged with 
medical malpractice. 
III. JUSTIFYING THE “EXCEPTIONAL” CASES 
As described in section II.B, there are three primary lines of objection 
to the use of contract- or tort-based defenses grounded in a patient’s 
voluntary acceptance of risk: objections based on the strength of the 
                                                     
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. (“The majority concedes the Shorters did not expressly assume the risk of the doctor’s 
negligence. Having decided that, it logically follows that the Shorters did not expressly assume the 
risk of bleeding to death as a result of refusing blood, where the need for such blood resulted from 
the doctor’s negligence rather than from the risks inherent in the procedure itself.”).  
201. See Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 257, 261–62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that the 
patient’s religious refusal to accept blood does not exempt him from the duty to mitigate damages). 
202. See Hall & Schneider, supra note 7, at 775 (in the context of patients requesting substandard 
treatment, noting that in the absence of contractual protections, a physician’s “only alternatives are 
to fire the patient or insist that the patient accept unwanted treatment”). 
203. See supra section II.B. 
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physician’s tort, fiduciary, and professional duties; objections based on 
the patient’s lack of choice and bargaining power; and objections based 
on the information disparity between doctor and patient. And yet, these 
concerns appear to have been swept aside by courts in the limited 
contexts of experimental and alternative therapy and Jehovah’s Witness 
patients, often with little explicit justification. These cases make clear 
that the traditionalist arguments grounded in patient vulnerability and 
physician duty cannot be relied upon to support an absolute prohibition 
on the use of such defenses. 
This Part revisits the arguments that courts have used to justify the 
law’s patient-protective attitude with respect to contract and tort 
defenses to medical malpractice. It closely examines the Jehovah’s 
Witness and alternative therapy cases and concludes that the courts 
deciding these cases—though rarely addressing these arguments 
directly—had good reasons to conclude that the traditional bar on such 
defenses was not appropriate in these contexts.204 But in failing to make 
clear exactly why these cases warrant an exception from the traditional 
rule, the courts also failed to recognize that the justifications for treating 
these cases differently could be extended to many other contexts in 
which patients seek out treatment that potentially falls outside the 
standard of care. Thus, this Part concludes that, in an era of consumer-
directed care, perhaps these “exceptional” cases are not as exceptional as 
they first might seem. 
A. Unwaivable Duties 
The first argument that courts and commentators frequently raise 
when rejecting defenses grounded in a patient’s voluntary acceptance of 
risk is that a physician’s duty to deliver medical treatment in accordance 
with the standard of care is absolute and cannot be waived by the 
patient’s voluntary agreement. According to this view, physicians’ duties 
are established not only by state licensing and medical malpractice laws, 
but also by fiduciary and ethical principles crafted to protect patients 
who hold a position of disadvantage in an inherently unequal power 
relationship. Thus, patients should have no more ability to relieve their 
physicians of duty to provide non-negligent care than the beneficiary of 
a trust could relieve a trustee of the duties of loyalty and care. 
While this claim is fundamentally appealing, it is impossible to 
reconcile with the fact that numerous courts have effectively negated the 
                                                     
204. See also Mehlman, supra note 7 (concluding that the outcomes in these outlier cases are 
justified because the cases satisfied the conditions for effective contracting). 
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physician’s duty to provide non-negligent care by allowing assumption 
of risk and waiver defenses to be presented in experimental and 
alternative treatment and Jehovah’s Witness cases. While there is sure to 
be some disagreement about whether a given treatment falls outside the 
standard of care, there can be no question that some of the cases where 
these defenses were permitted involved treatments that posed such 
serious risks that the medical community as a whole rejected them as 
valid medical approaches. In Charell v. Gonzalez, for example, a 
physician practicing alternative medicine suggested that a patient with 
uterine cancer be treated with a special diet and six coffee enemas a day, 
which he assured her had a 75% success rate.205 In Boyle v. Revici,206 all 
the parties stipulated that Dr. Revici’s methods for treating cancer—
which apparently consisted of urinalysis and ingestion of “various 
mineral compounds,”207—vinegar, baking soda, and eggs208—constituted 
violations of the standard of care.209 In Poag v. Atkins,210 the physician 
of a patient with breast cancer encouraged her to forgo radiation and 
chemotherapy, and instead recommended a regimen of vitamins and 
antioxidants that medical groups considered unsafe but that the 
defendant physician alleged would “definitely cure” the patient’s 
cancer.211 Courts’ willingness to accept assumption of risk and waiver of 
liability defenses in these cases seems entirely inconsistent with the 
principle that physicians cannot be relieved of the duty to provide 
treatment that satisfies professional standards of care. 
As noted in section II.C, the best justifications offered by courts that 
have permitted these defenses to proceed are grounded in policy 
preferences. In the alternative treatment and religious refusal contexts, 
courts have concluded—either explicitly or implicitly—that society 
would be better off allowing such treatments to continue, even though 
they may fall outside the professional standard of care. For example, in 
Colton, the court allowed defendants to rely on a covenant not to sue in a 
                                                     
205. Charell v. Gonzalez, 673 N.Y.S.2d 685, 666 (App. Div. 1998). In Charell, the lower court’s 
jury unanimously concluded that the physician’s treatment constituted malpractice and awarded the 
plaintiff over $4.5 million in damages. Id. at 667. The jury’s conclusions were upheld on appeal, as 
was its compensatory damage award (a $150,000 punitive damages award was later vacated). Id. at 
686.  
206. 961 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1992). 
207. Id. at 1062. 
208. See Revici v. Comm’r of Educ., 546 N.Y.S.2d 240, 242 (1989). 
209. Boyle, 961 F.2d at 1062. 
210. 806 N.Y.S.2d 448, 2005 WL 2219689 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 12, 2005) (unpublished table 
decision). 
211. Id. at *1. 
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malpractice case concerning a highly experimental kidney transplant 
procedure on the grounds that federal and state legislation indicated a 
“public policy encouraging such necessary activity as experimental 
medical research.”212 In Shorter, the court justified its acceptance of an 
express assumption of risk defense by reference to policy considerations, 
noting that the alternative to allowing such defenses in Jehovah’s 
Witness cases would be a refusal by doctors to accept patients with 
certain religious beliefs, an outcome that the court described as 
“repugnant in a society which attempts to make medical care available to 
all its members.”213 In other words, if society would benefit from the 
provision of unorthodox and potentially negligent treatment, physicians 
ought to be allowed to provide it to informed patients without fear of 
liability. 
If courts in some cases are willing to accept these consequentialist 
arguments, then clearly the duty-based principle requiring physicians to 
provide treatment in accordance with the standard of care is not absolute. 
Indeed, many commentators have taken this argument and applied it to a 
broader variety of contexts beyond those of religious refusal and 
experimental or alternative therapy. Scholars have argued that if we as a 
society truly want to promote innovation,214 or cost-effective care,215 or 
some other form of creativity in the delivery of medical treatment, then 
assumption of risk and contractual waiver must be accepted as valid 
defenses. The alternative, they claim, is that physicians with no 
protection against litigation will either be unwilling to accept patients 
seeking such treatment or will resort to coercing patients to accept the 
standard of care.216 
But the challenges to implementing policy-based exceptions to 
physicians’ duties of care—and drawing clear lines between cases where 
defenses will be recognized and where they will be rejected—should be 
                                                     
212. Colton v. N.Y. Hosp., 414 N.Y.S.2d 866, 875 (Sup. Ct. 1979).  
213. Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 652–53, 695 P.2d 116, 120–21 (1985). 
214. See, e.g., Laakmann, supra note 8; Michael H. Cohen, A Fixed Star in Health Care Reform: 
The Emerging Paradigm of Holistic Healing, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 79 (1995). 
215. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 7; Hall & Schneider, supra note 7; supra section II.A. 
216. E. Haavi Morreim, High-Deductible Health Plans: New Twists on Old Challenges from Tort 
and Contract, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1231–32 (2006) (supporting an argument for assumption of 
risk in the context of cost-constrained treatment by citing judicial concern that physicians would 
otherwise be required to compel treatment against a patient’s wishes); Hall, supra note 7, at 178 
(describing “informed refusal” as a form of express assumption of risk, and noting that providing 
care against a patient’s informed refusal would constitute battery); Hall & Schneider, supra note 7, 
at 759–60 (noting that courts “caution against liability rules that encourage doctors to coerce or 
abandon patients”). 
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obvious. Judgments about whether society would be better off if certain 
unorthodox treatments were available without risk of liability are 
necessarily subjective.217 The academic debate about whether allowing 
patients to negotiate for cost-constrained treatment will make patients 
better off is just one example, albeit the most well-discussed in the 
literature.218 But many other examples abound. Consider, for example, 
the disputes that might arise in the already-controversial context of 
reproductive rights. Pro-choice advocates who believe that women 
suffering medically risky pregnancies should not be deprived of the 
option to abort will fundamentally disagree with those who believe that 
patients should be able to choose physicians who provide medical care 
in accordance with religious directives that limit the availability of 
abortion in all but the most exceptional cases. A court called upon to 
decide whether patients in such contexts ought to be able to waive their 
physicians’ duty to provide standard of care treatment will have a 
difficult time justifying its holding either way. 
Similar conflicts are likely to arise when courts are called upon to 
assess the societal value of any treatments at the edge of responsible 
medical practice, including those described in section I.B. If courts 
believe there is some value in allowing patients to seek out experimental 
cancer therapy involving coffee enemas, how unusual does a treatment 
need to be before a court is willing to step in to bar a physician’s 
assumption of risk defense when his patient dies prematurely as a result 
of untreated cancer? In light of the widespread public concern about the 
dramatically rising costs of health care, would it be reasonable for courts 
to bind a patient to the consequences of an informed decision to seek out 
sub-standard care for cost reasons? Given the tragic consequences of 
botched attempts at self-amputation by patients with apotemnophilia, is 
there societal value in barring malpractice suits against physicians who 
perform voluntary amputations on consenting patients, even if those 
patients later regret their choice? The reasoning in alternative therapy 
and Jehovah’s Witness cases opens the door to similar holdings in other 
cases of unorthodox treatment—but how far that door opens will depend 
on societal value judgments that are entirely unpredictable. 
                                                     
217. See Mehlman, supra note 7, at 409–10 (“Yet all bargains whereby patients waive legal rights 
might be said to benefit society, such as by lowering health care costs, which would argue in favor 
of upholding all waivers, including those outside the experimental context.”); Schuck, supra note 4, 
at 912 (the fact that assumption of risk is a jury issue means it is “in reality a culturally constructed 
and highly normative doctrine, one that is highly responsive to changing social values”). 
218. See supra section II.A. 
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Thus far, the only clear line that can be drawn based on existing case 
law is the line distinguishing between unanticipated negligence in the 
performance of an otherwise standard treatment (whereby such 
negligence is deemed to have no societal value and deserves no 
protection) and the offering of treatments outside of the standard of care 
that pose unique risks but that informed patients nevertheless seek out 
(which may be societally beneficial in some cases).219 And while courts 
have been willing to waive physicians’ duty to satisfy the standard of 
care in alternative treatment and Jehovah’s Witness cases, their 
reasoning provides no clear justification for limiting waivers to those 
two contexts. Surely, other forms of unconventional treatment that the 
medical profession deems to be outside standard of care may also 
provide societal benefits and could likewise be justified using this 
consequentialist reasoning. 
B. Freedom of Choice and Disparities in Bargaining Power 
The second argument for rejecting defenses based on a patient’s 
acceptance of risk is that one of elements required for truly voluntary 
and informed decision-making—freedom of choice—cannot be satisfied 
in medical contexts. If a patient’s decision to explicitly or implicitly 
assume the risks of treatment is involuntary or unfairly constrained, 
there are good reasons to bar the use of these defenses. Proponents of 
this position point out that patients seeking medical treatment typically 
do so out of necessity, and not out of a desire to satisfy arbitrary 
personal preferences. They do not choose to be sick and have no 
alternative to seeking out medical care. Depending on a patient’s 
                                                     
219. An analogy might be drawn here to the distinction drawn by E. Haavi Morreim in the 
context of physicians who practice under resource constraints imposed by insurance plans. She 
distinguishes between physicians’ “standard of medical expertise,” which encompasses the duty to 
exercise clinical knowledge, skills, and judgment when treating a patient; and their “standard of 
resource use,” which encompasses a duty to advocate for their patients and disclose conflicts of 
interest when they lack control over resource allocation. See generally E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine 
Meets Resource Limits: Restructuring the Legal Standard of Care, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1997); E. 
Haavi Morreim, Stratified Scarcity: Redefining the Standard of Care, 17 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 356 
(1989). Under Morreim’s model, physicians are always obligated to diligently apply their clinical 
skills and knowledge in treating patients, but they “do not have a presumptive right to distribute 
other people’s money and property without their consent” and so owe no duty to patients to provide 
all treatments they deem medically necessary. Morreim, Stratified Scarcity, supra, at 360. Similarly, 
one might argue for a distinction between the physicians’ choice of treatment (though in our case, 
the choice is based on the patient’s request rather than an insurer’s resource constraint), and the 
provision of that treatment in accordance with the standard of skill, knowledge, and diligence 
expected of reasonable physicians. See Hall & Schneider, supra note 7, at 771 (distinguishing 
between resources and skill). 
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condition, she may be limited to a single treatment option. And in many 
cases, a patient’s choice of providers is limited to the network offered by 
her insurance company, so she may be unable to “shop around” in the 
way that consumers of other services can. 
From this perspective, it becomes clear why courts have been more 
willing to accept physician defenses in the alternative treatment and 
Jehovah’s Witness cases.220 These patients, while driven by medical 
necessity to seek out treatment, do not seem to be at the same 
disadvantage as, for example, the patient seeking emergency care in 
Tunkl. In these situations, the patients are not “settling” in their choice of 
treatment or providers; rather, they are taking affirmative steps to seek 
out physicians willing to provide treatments that best align with their 
preferences and values (albeit treatments that arguably fall outside the 
standard of care).221 However, beyond the limited contexts of 
experimental, alternative, and religiously-directed treatment, the same 
argument could be made any time a patient makes an informed decision 
to receive her first-choice treatment from a willing provider—in such 
case, there would likewise seem to be no lack of options, voluntariness, 
or bargaining power. 
The only perspective from which such a decision might be considered 
unfairly constrained is with respect to the patient’s ability to negotiate 
with her provider for different terms regarding risk allocation. In Tunkl 
and other cases, courts justify their rejection of liability waivers on the 
grounds that patients seeking medical care are at an inherent bargaining 
disadvantage, specifically with respect to the opportunity to negotiate for 
greater legal protection from malpractice.222 And yet, this concern about 
patients’ lack of bargaining power, so prominent in cases like Tunkl and 
among opponents of contract-based approached to health care, does not 
seem to cause the same consternation in all contexts. For example, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, whose religious convictions bar them from 
receiving blood or blood products, have only two choices when seeking 
surgical care: receive treatment from a provider who is willing to operate 
without blood, or forgo surgery entirely. Because surgeons are unlikely 
                                                     
220. See Mehlman, supra note 7. 
221. Kenneth Simons, in a seminal article on assumption of risk doctrine, relies on this 
distinction. He argues that assumption of risk should be a valid defense in cases of “full preference” 
(where a plaintiff really does prefer to encounter a defendant’s negligence than to pursue a less-
risky option) and in cases of “victim insistence on a relationship” (where a plaintiff insists on a 
relationship with the tortious actor, such relationship primarily benefits the plaintiff, and the 
defendant either voluntarily chooses to accept the relationship with the plaintiff or has no 
opportunity to refuse it). Simons, supra note 109, at 504–06, 513–17. 
222. See supra section II.B.2. 
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to operate on patients committed to refusing blood even in life-
threatening circumstances without a release, these patients are 
effectively forced to sign releases from liability for injuries resulting 
from blood loss if they want to receive treatment. In this sense, the 
religious patient’s choice to receive medical services in the absence of 
tort law protections is just as involuntary as the choice of a patient of 
limited financial means, as in Tunkl or Ash. One patient is restricted in 
the treatment she can obtain by virtue of religious belief; the other is 
restricted by virtue of financial constraints. And yet, courts in Jehovah’s 
Witness cases point to the patient’s lack of options as a justification for 
allowing acceptance of risk defenses, rather than an objection. The 
experimental and alternative treatment cases follow a similar model—
courts note that patients who reject mainstream treatment and instead 
seek out alternative therapy might, in the absence of acceptance of risk 
defenses, never find providers willing to treat them.223 Surely, these 
patients would prefer to retain the right to sue, but in these contexts, 
courts seem to have no qualms about enforcing releases of liability or 
accepting assumption of risk as a defense. 
In fact, patients seeking out unorthodox care actually seem to be in a 
worse position to bargain for liability protections. In cases like Tunkl, 
where concerns about patients’ voluntary choice regularly arise, patients 
are seeking out high-quality treatment, and wish to retain a remedy if 
that treatment is performed negligently—an outcome both patient and 
provider are hoping to avoid. But in the cases discussed in section II.C, 
arguing that the patients should have the option to retain the right to sue 
for malpractice seems nonsensical. In these cases, both doctor and 
patient are committed to a treatment plan that, even if performed as 
intended, potentially constitutes malpractice. When both parties 
anticipate the risk that the provider’s treatment might be outside the 
standard of care, there is no world in which the patient could receive this 
treatment and meaningfully retain the right to sue. In contrast, it is 
possible to imagine a scenario where a physician offering standard 
treatment allows a patient to bargain for legal protection in exchange for 
higher fees, because he believes the chances of his committing 
unintentional negligence are low. 
Perhaps, then, it is this contrast that justifies the differential treatment 
of these cases. Because physicians offering standard of care treatment 
                                                     
223. See, e.g., Charell v. Gonzalez, 660 N.Y.S.2d 665, 668 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (noting that in the 
absence of “having the patient execute a comprehensive consent containing appropriate information 
as to the risks involved,” a practitioner of alternative or “non-conventional” medicine could not 
prevail in a malpractice case). 
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may vary in their use of waivers of liability, and may be willing to 
negotiate the shifting of liability risk with patients willing to pay higher 
fees, there is a risk that permitting waivers of liability in typical 
malpractice cases might lead to a two-tiered system of medical care. 
Patients with financial means may be able to negotiate with providers to 
retain the right to litigate in the event of medical malpractice, while 
patients who are in desperate need of care or who lack the resources to 
negotiate with or to select physicians will have no choice but to accept 
the terms presented to them. Such a stratified system of care, according 
to many courts, would be unacceptable.224 In contrast, in the context of 
unorthodox care that by its very nature likely constitutes negligence and 
where waivers are effectively a precondition of treatment, no patient is at 
a disadvantage with respect to any other patient, and there is little 
potential for stratification based on ability to pay. 
This explanation, however, seems unsatisfactory. Courts’ language 
emphasizing the importance of preserving choice and fair opportunities 
for bargaining when seeking medical care is consistently emphatic and 
does not seem to distinguish between different treatment contexts. Thus, 
it would seem odd to conclude that courts only care about patients’ lack 
of bargaining power in contexts where some patients have the ability to 
bargain, but are willing to overlook medical providers’ significant 
bargaining advantage in cases where all patients lack bargaining power. 
What other explanation might be offered to justify the differential 
treatment of Jehovah’s Witness and alternative therapy cases? It seems 
that the only real difference is the one highlighted initially—that in these 
unorthodox treatment cases, patients are receiving their first choice of 
treatment and providers, whereas in many other contexts patients’ 
choices may be limited by their financial means and insurance coverage. 
For example, patients seeking treatment at a low-cost clinic because it is 
the only care they can afford might prefer to go to a top-ranked hospital 
that does not require a liability waiver, but this choice is not available to 
them.225 Thus, setting aside patients’ ability (or lack thereof) to bargain 
for legal protection from malpractice, the typical patient’s choice seems 
less voluntary than the choice of the patient pursuing care outside the 
                                                     
224. See section II.B.2.  
225. It is worth noting that patients seeking low-cost care at federally qualified health centers are 
in fact barred, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, from suing the health centers and their employees 
for injuries suffered as a result of negligent medical care. About the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA), HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., https://bphc.hrsa.gov/ftca/about/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/H5CV-XT5J]. However, the patients do retain a right of recovery against the 
federal government. Id. 
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medical mainstream. As a result, courts might be less willing to bind the 
typical patient to a contractual waiver or find that she voluntarily 
assumed the risk of negligent treatment.226 
The challenge with this distinction is that it rests upon a post facto 
assessment of the patient’s preferences and wishes, and does not lend 
itself to a bright-line rule. For example, a second patient at the same 
low-cost clinic may be wealthy but frugal, and eager to save money in 
exchange for abandoning his right to legal recourse in the unlikely event 
of malpractice. If this type of bargain is the patient’s true preference, 
then under the model described above he would be permitted to waive 
his right to sue, but the first patient would not. But it seems very 
unlikely that a court would be willing to draw such fine distinctions 
when analyzing the validity of defenses based on a patient’s voluntary 
acceptance of risk. 
Thus, while courts consistently highlight the disparity in bargaining 
power between doctor and patient to justify rejection of waiver and 
assumption of risk defenses, they do not appear to do so consistently. In 
Jehovah’s Witness and alternative therapy cases, courts are willing to 
consider these defenses despite the patients’ complete lack of bargaining 
power—and, surprisingly, there appears to be no principled justification 
for this outcome. Without a clear justification, it is impossible to draw a 
dividing line between these two contexts and the many others where 
patients might seek treatment outside the standard of care that would not 
be available to them if their physicians had no legal protection. The 
holdings in these cases call into question the widely accepted principle 
that patients, who as a general rule lack bargaining power as against 
their medical providers, should retain the right to sue for negligence 
even when they expressly or implicitly assume the risks of that 
negligence. Ultimately, the courts’ holdings in the Jehovah’s Witness 
and experimental treatment cases seem to suggest that as long as a 
patient in need of medical care makes an informed decision to seek her 
first choice of treatment from a willing medical provider, and that 
treatment inherently falls outside the standard of care, a waiver of 
liability will be enforceable even if the patient had no opportunity to 
bargain with her provider for greater protection. 
                                                     
226. This distinction speaks to the concern mentioned in section III.A about unintentional 
negligence versus intentional negligence. 
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C. Information Disparity 
The final concern raised in cases rejecting contract- and tort-based 
defenses based on a patient’s acceptance of risk speaks to the 
information disparity between doctor and patient. Proponents of this 
view note that patients are at an inherent informational disadvantage 
compared to physicians—not only in terms of understanding the risks 
and benefits of various treatment options, but also in terms of 
understanding the likelihood of malpractice and the risks associated with 
losing legal protection in the event that malpractice does occur. 
As to the former concern, which would be fatal to any assumption of 
risk defense,227 the foundational principles underlying the doctrine of 
informed consent effectively negate this argument. Provided the patient 
is fully informed of the comparative risks and benefits of various 
treatment options (including those more in keeping with standard 
medical practices), as is already required by law, the information 
imbalance between doctor and patient is minimized. Thus, when a 
patient is actively seeking out treatment that a jury might find to be 
outside the standard of care—as in the case of experimental treatment or 
completely bloodless surgery—and her provider has satisfied his legal 
obligation to disclose the inherent risks and benefits of the requested 
treatment and its alternatives, there can be no concern that the patient 
lacks the medical information needed to make a voluntary choice.228 In 
contrast, the validity of patient’s assumption of risk can be questioned if 
her physician fails to accurately disclose the inherent risks and benefits 
of the treatment,229 or if her physician’s negligent conduct results in 
harms beyond the disclosed inherent risks of treatment.230 
                                                     
227. In contrast, enforcement of a contractual waiver does not require proof of such specific 
knowledge on the part of the patient. 
228. But see Mehlman, supra note 7, at 391–93 (noting that a physician’s disclosure duties under 
the doctrine of informed consent are narrower than should be required under a doctrine of “fiduciary 
disclosure”). 
229. Surprisingly, however, some of the experimental treatment cases have held that a patient 
may be informed enough to assume the risk of negligent medical treatment even if her physician 
fails to accurately disclose the inherent risks and benefits of the treatment. In these cases, courts 
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of assumption of risk where 
patients had independent knowledge of the experimental or alternative therapy, but disclosure by 
physicians was allegedly lacking. See supra note 163. The problems with this approach are 
discussed in greater detail in section IV.A.1. 
230. This distinction aligns with the distinction courts draw between cases where patients 
intentionally seek out treatment that, if performed as intended, falls outside the standard of care, and 
those where an otherwise standard treatment is negligently performed. See supra section III.A. 
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The other perspective from which patients might be considered to be 
at an informational disadvantage as compared to physicians is that some 
patients might not be aware that, by proceeding with a risky treatment or 
signing a contractual waiver, they are limiting their right to sue for 
malpractice.231 Given that contract law requires exculpatory clauses to 
be clear and unambiguous, such that the signatory understands the rights 
she is waiving, a patient’s inability to understand the consequences of 
signing a waiver would be fatal to its enforcement.232 And yet, this very 
legitimate concern cannot fully explain the divergent outcomes in the 
cases discussed herein. In Tunkl, for example, the patient signed a 
document that included the following language: 
RELEASE: The hospital is a nonprofit, charitable institution. In 
consideration of the hospital and allied services to be rendered 
and the rates charged therefor, the patient or his legal 
representative agrees to and hereby releases The Regents of the 
University of California, and the hospital from any and all 
liability for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its 
employees, if the hospital has used due care in selecting its 
employees.233 
By any account of contract interpretation, this language seems clear 
and specific enough to put a signatory on notice of the rights being 
waived. And yet, despite the satisfaction of the formalities required for 
exculpatory clauses—and despite the court’s deference to the jury’s 
determination that the plaintiff “either knew or should have known the 
significance of the release”—the court refused to enforce the release on 
policy grounds.234 In contrast, some courts in Jehovah’s Witness cases 
have carefully evaluated the precision and specificity of contractual 
language in order to reach decisions as to the enforceability of a waiver. 
In Garcia, for example, the court held that a release signed by a 
Jehovah’s Witness patient that “explicitly delineated the desires and 
                                                     
231. Some authors suggest that this problem might be solved by requiring fiduciary standards of 
disclosure regarding the legal consequences of a patient’s choice to proceed with risky treatment. 
See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note 7, at 383 (suggesting that a fiduciary disclosure model would require 
disclosure of information regarding “allocation of risk”). 
232. The tort defense of assumption of risk, in contrast, does not require knowledge on the part of 
the patient that proceeding with treatment with knowledge of its risks might bar recovery if those 
risks manifest themselves—assumption of risk is implied by behavior. 
233. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 442 (Cal. 1963). 
234. In a footnote, the court noted that at the time the plaintiff signed the release, he “was in great 
pain, under sedation, and probably unable to read.” Id. at 442 n.1. However, the court did not 
overturn the jury’s finding that the plaintiff “either knew or should have known the significance of 
the release.” Id. 
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intentions of both parties” barred the patient’s suit as a matter of law.235 
But in Corlett, the court held that a similar release of liability for surgery 
without blood did not bar a malpractice suit, because the language of the 
release did not specifically relieve physician from liability for 
negligence in diagnosis and treatment.236 
Thus, while the disparity in understanding between doctor and patient 
as to the legal implications of a decision to proceed with treatment may 
certainly justify non-enforcement of contractual releases that lack the 
appropriate language,237 decisions in cases like Tunkl show that 
correction of this informational disparity is not sufficient to save such 
releases. 
The experimental treatment, alternative treatment, and Jehovah’s 
Witness cases, then, seem to establish that as long as a patient is 
informed of the risks and benefits of the various treatment options 
(whether by way of an informed consent conversation with the physician 
or through the patient’s independent knowledge), and as long as any 
contractual language waiving liability is sufficiently precise, there is no 
meaningful informational disadvantage that would bar the use of tort or 
contract defenses based on voluntary acceptance of risk where the 
patient suffers injury as a result of a risk inherent in a medical 
procedure—even if the physician violated the standard of care by 
offering that procedure. 
IV. CAUTIONS AND CHALLENGES 
Part III reconsidered the “exceptional” alternative treatment and 
Jehovah’s Witness cases in light of the three traditional objections to the 
use of contract- and tort-based defenses based on a patient’s voluntary 
acceptance of risk. It concluded that while there are good reasons for 
courts to treat these cases differently from typical cases of medical 
malpractice, those reasons would likewise be applicable to many other 
                                                     
235. Garcia v. Edgewater Hosp., 613 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
236. Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
237. See, e.g., Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that the covenant not to 
sue in the consent form signed by the patient was unenforceable due to lack of precision); 
Abramowitz v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., Coll. of Dentistry, 494 N.Y.S.2d 721, 724 (App. Div. 1985) 
(rejecting an exculpatory clause on the grounds that the contractual language did not “unmistakenly 
express an intention on the part of the plaintiff to absolve the defendant of liability for its own 
negligence”); Poag v. Atkins, 806 N.Y.S.2d 448, 2005 WL 2219689, at *3 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 12, 2005) 
(unpublished table decision) (rejecting exculpatory agreement in a medical malpractice case because 
“no separate heading or caption was present to alert the decedent that she was foregoing the right to 
bring suit”). 
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contexts in which patients knowingly and voluntarily pursue unorthodox 
and potentially negligent treatment. 
First, these cases demonstrate that the physician’s duty to provide 
treatment in accordance with the standard of care is by no means 
absolute. Where judges or juries believe that the non-standard treatment 
serves greater societal interests not recognized by a strict interpretation 
of the medical community’s standards, they are willing to waive a 
physician’s duty to comply with the standard of care (or at least limit 
liability to some degree). 
Second, despite courts’ and commentators’ insistence that patients 
should not be able to waive their right to sue because of their bargaining 
disadvantage with respect to medical providers, the alternative treatment 
and Jehovah’s Witness cases belie this notion. Even in situations where 
physicians would flatly refuse to provide treatment to patients with life-
threatening illnesses in the absence of liability protection, courts have 
been willing to recognize some patients’ decisions to explicitly or 
implicitly waive their right to sue. 
Finally, while the information disparity between doctor and patient is 
certainly a concern, these cases demonstrate that it is possible for a 
patient to be informed enough to voluntarily assume the risk of negligent 
medical treatment. If the medical risks and injuries that manifest 
themselves are those inherent in the requested treatment—where that 
treatment, even if performed as intended, falls outside the standard of 
care—then a patient’s informed consent to treatment effectively serves 
as a defense to liability. And some cases, surprisingly, found sufficient 
evidence of assumption of risk even where disclosure by physicians was 
allegedly lacking, but patients possessed independent knowledge of the 
risks of treatment. 
Based on these precedents, we can conclude that beyond the contexts 
of patients seeking experimental, alternative, or religiously-directed 
treatment, courts have good reason to be receptive to contract- and tort-
based defenses when patients knowingly and voluntarily seek out 
treatment that falls outside the standard of care, as long as: (a) patients 
are fully informed of the treatment’s medical risks and benefits, as well 
as the risks and benefits of alternative available treatments; (b) the 
treatment is performed in accordance with expectations, such that the 
risks that ultimately arise are those inherent in the treatment—that is, not 
caused by unanticipated error in the performance or administration of the 
treatment; and (c) the legal factfinder believes there is some societal 
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value in having this treatment available, even if the medical community 
as a whole rejects it.238 
A. Additional Requirements for Patient Protection 
As a descriptive matter, the cases discussed in this Article support the 
use of contract- and tort-based defenses in medical malpractice cases 
upon the satisfaction of the above three conditions. Normatively, 
however, I argue that additional conditions ought to be imposed to 
strengthen protections for patients, particularly with respect to ensuring 
that a patient’s consent is fully informed and voluntary. 
1. Satisfaction of Physician’s Informed Consent Duties 
The most concerning conclusion in at least some of these cases is the 
suggestion that a patient might be deemed informed enough to assume 
the risk of treatment even if her physician did not fully inform her of the 
risks of treatment. 
In Charell, for example, the court found sufficient evidence to support 
an informed consent claim where the physician told his patient that an 
alternative therapy had a 75% success rate, failed to disclose that he was 
not an oncologist, failed to inform her that the treatment was 
experimental and not generally accepted among physicians, and failed to 
provide information about the risks of and alternatives to the treatment 
protocol.239 Nevertheless, the court upheld the jury’s finding that the 
plaintiff impliedly assumed the risk of treatment, noting that the patient 
had sufficient knowledge of the risks of treatment from sources other 
than her physician.240 The court pointed out that the plaintiff was “a 
well-educated person who . . . did a significant amount of investigation 
regarding the treatment being offered by defendant and hence became 
quite knowledgeable on the subject.”241 Similarly, in Poag, the physician 
allegedly assured the patient that an alternative treatment involving 
vitamins and antioxidants could “definitely cure” her breast cancer, and 
did not inform her that the treatment protocol was experimental and 
                                                     
238. It is this final requirement that poses the greatest challenge in any efforts to predict the 
outcome of cases where patients are harmed as a result of unorthodox treatments like those 
described in section I.B. There is simply no accounting for judges’ and jurors’ varying perspectives 
on the value of such treatments to society. See discussion supra section III.A. 
239. Charell v. Gonzalez, 660 N.Y.S.2d 665, 668 (Sup. Ct. 1997). 
240. Id. at 669. 
241. Id. 
Sawicki – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  9:48 PM 
950 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:891 
 
considered unsafe by some medical groups.242 Nevertheless, the court 
concluded that there was a triable issue of fact as to what risks the 
plaintiff was actually informed of and whether she impliedly assumed 
these risks.243 
It is troubling to think that a physician might benefit from defenses 
based on a patient’s acceptance of risk despite having breached his duty 
to inform the patient of the risks of treatment and its alternatives. 
Nevertheless—and perhaps surprisingly—it is not doctrinally illogical. 
As Mehlman notes, pure applications of contract and tort law do not 
effectively account for the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship.244 The traditional tort defense of assumption of risk, for 
example, requires only that a plaintiff voluntarily choose to encounter 
known risks—it does not speak to how the plaintiff obtains knowledge 
of these risks. Contract law, of course, imposes greater disclosure duties 
on defendants, by requiring that the contractual language in liability 
waivers (typically drafted by defendants) specifically define the scope of 
risk the plaintiff is assuming. However, neither contract nor tort defenses 
impose a non-delegable duty245 on the defendant to communicate—in 
detail and in person—both the risks and benefits of the encounter the 
plaintiff is choosing to pursue, and the risks and benefits of alternative 
options the plaintiff might choose.246 Thus, in a case like Charrell, a 
                                                     
242. Poag, 806 N.Y.S.2d 448, 2005 WL 2219689, at *1 (unpublished table decision). 
243. Id. 
244. See generally Mehlman, supra note 7. 
245. The physician’s duty to obtain a patient’s informed consent is widely viewed as a duty that 
cannot be delegated to others. See, e.g., Robert Gatter, The Mysterious Survival of the Policy 
Against Informed Consent Liability for Hospitals, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1203, 1205 (2006) 
(noting that “established law . . . presumes that control over—and, consequently, responsibility 
for—informed consent should reside exclusively with physicians”); Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 
453–54 (Pa. 2017) (holding that under Pennsylvania’s informed consent statute, the duty to secure a 
patient’s informed consent rests exclusively with the physician and cannot be delegated). 
246. Moreover, some scholars suggest that the enforcement of waivers of liability ought not be 
conditioned on proof of an informed consent-type disclosure conversation. For example, Hall and 
Schneider—in arguing that patients’ refusals of standard care for cost reasons should be treated as 
an issue of contract (rather than tort)—conclude that the law “should not require special evidence or 
proof of informed refusal, assumption of risk, or waiver of liability” when evaluating a patient’s 
contractual refusal, provided there is no fraud or misrepresentation on the physician’s part. Hall & 
Schneider, supra note 7, at 775. Hall and Schneider justify their position by noting that when 
patients refuse recommended care, physicians already “have incentives to convince patients to say 
yes,” and that therefore “the law need not scrutinize how vigorously they did so.” Id. In arguing 
against “full-bore informed consent” for patient refusals of costly treatment, Hall and Schneider 
seem to distinguish refusals of treatment from consent to treatment. Id. I find this distinction 
untenable. When a patient refuses the standard of care treatment and opts for a less-costly 
alternative, there are elements of both refusal and consent. Unless the patient is refusing any 
treatment, she will have to provide consent for the treatment she ultimately chooses—and as a legal 
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patient might be limited in her right of recovery for medical malpractice, 
while still retaining an independent right to recover for an informed 
consent violation.247 
I posit, however, that a physician’s legal duties under the doctrine of 
informed consent should not be disentangled from his right to raise a 
defense when a patient chooses an unorthodox treatment that may 
constitute medical malpractice. Allowing physicians to benefit from 
defenses based on a patient’s voluntary acceptance of risk when they 
have not fully informed their patients of the risks of treatment—while 
perhaps permissible under pure doctrines of contractual waiver and 
assumption of risk—is fundamentally inconsistent with the medical 
profession’s legal and ethical duties of disclosure. To meaningfully 
protect patients’ interests in such cases, physicians should be able to rely 
on contract- and tort-based defenses only if they satisfy their obligation 
to secure the patient’s informed consent to treatment. 
Of course, some might argue that conditioning malpractice defenses 
on satisfaction of the physician’s informed consent obligations is 
insufficiently protective of patient interests. The idea that a patient’s 
informed consent to negligent treatment might effectively constitute an 
assumption of risk is in itself highly controversial.248 This is because the 
legal and ethical doctrines of informed consent are fundamentally tools 
for patient protection—they grant patients a right to receive information 
from their physicians that furthers their ability to make autonomous 
decisions, and allow patients to recover damages if their physicians do 
not satisfy their disclosure obligations. Assumption of risk and waiver of 
liability, in contrast, are tools for physician protection—they grant 
patients no rights and operate only to reduce patients’ ability to recover 
damages. Thus, some might argue that it is unfair to tie these two 
doctrines together at all—that a rights-conferring doctrine (informed 
consent) should never be used in a way that reduces or eliminates a 
plaintiff’s legal remedies. 
                                                     
matter, this requires the physician to disclose the risks and benefits of the various treatment options, 
including the standard of care the patient has refused. 
247. This would be one rare context in which the common criticism that informed consent and 
malpractice actions are redundant would not apply. See Hall et al., supra note 113, at 431 (noting 
that where a claim for informed consent “overlaps with ordinary malpractice, . . . it is mostly 
redundant” because deviation from the customary standard of care constitutes negligence, 
“regardless of the presence or absence of consent”). 
248. See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Making Religion Transparent 10 (2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (referring critically to the idea that informed consent might be 
treated as an assumption of risk in the context of health care providers’ religious refusals to provide 
treatment). 
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While there is certainly merit to this position, I believe that it does not 
account for the true richness of the principle of patient autonomy. 
Respecting a competent person’s autonomous decision sometimes means 
allowing that person to make a choice that others think is unreasonable. 
And while many critics have argued that the pendulum of medical 
practice has swung too far in the direction of patient autonomy at the 
expense of other important ethical principles (like justice and 
beneficence),249 that argument does not speak to the precise issue 
addressed in this Article. Certainly, in some exceptional cases, one 
might opt to balance the values of beneficence and autonomy in such a 
way that would justify overriding a patient’s informed decision and 
imposing treatment against the patient’s will. But if a patient has already 
made a decision and acted upon it, the opportunity to protect the patient 
from making a poor choice has already passed—the balance of values 
has already been struck. If we value autonomy enough to permit patients 
to make such choices without interference by state actors or medical 
professionals, then it seems incongruous to justify retroactively freeing 
these patients from the consequences of their informed and autonomous 
choices.250 
2. Addressing Physician Influence 
Another question to consider in developing a more patient-protective 
approach is whether a physician’s recommendation might be so 
influential that it would effectively render the patient’s treatment 
decision non-autonomous. As a result of the power dynamic inherent in 
the physician-patient relationship, physicians have significant ability to 
influence patient decision-making. That is, even if two physicians 
present identical facts about treatment options, their recommendations as 
to treatment, or the way in which they frame those facts, may sway a 
patient’s decision.251 Given how much a physician’s own perspective 
                                                     
249. See, e.g., Moulton & King, supra note 26, at 88 (discussing criticism of “a decision-making 
model that relies entirely on patient autonomy”); Quill & Brody, supra note 19, at 764 (arguing that 
misunderstanding about what it means to respect patient autonomy has led physicians to neglect 
their duties to advise patients). 
250. Taking this approach would treat a patient’s informed agreement to receive treatment from a 
physician as a type of voidable contract. Typically, contracts are only voidable if they are made 
under conditions of coercion, fraud, or minority. See generally WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra 
note 96, § 1:20. 
251. See generally Judith Covey, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Presenting Treatment Benefits 
in Different Formats, 27 MED. DECISION MAKING 638 (2007); Theresa M. Marteau, Framing of 
Information: Its Influence on Decisions of Doctors and Patients, 28 BRITISH J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 89 
(1989). 
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can influence his patients’ decisions, there is a concern that the 
“voluntariness” required for a patient to effectively assume a risk 
(whether implicitly or by way of contract) may be compromised. 
To a certain extent, this is an unavoidable problem. Every decision a 
person makes is based on innumerable factors and influences. Claiming 
that a person’s decision is non-autonomous simply because it has been 
influenced by another’s perspective is a difficult argument to defend. 
Furthermore, principles of medical ethics explicitly acknowledge that 
physicians do have a role in advising patients, and that complete 
neutrality in conveying factual information without any 
acknowledgment of values neglects important aspects of the physician’s 
fiduciary obligations.252 
In the types of cases described in this Article, moreover, patients are 
often the ones driving medical decision-making—sometimes over their 
physicians’ initial objections. In such cases, there is little opportunity for 
undue physician influence. For example, a Jehovah’s Witness patient 
whose religious convictions bar the use of blood products is unlikely to 
be swayed by any recommendation to transfuse blood. While a patient 
whose values are not quite so absolute, such as a patient who prefers 
alternative therapy to conventional treatment, is perhaps more likely to 
be affected by a physician’s recommendation, such patients often choose 
their physicians specifically because they are willing to offer treatments 
that align with the patient’s values.253 Thus, one could argue that 
physicians should be able to benefit from assumption of risk-based 
defenses only if the patient’s commitment to an unorthodox treatment is 
so fixed that the physician has little ability to influence the patient’s 
decision. This, however, is an extremely fact-sensitive determination 
(and one that is, moreover, subject to significant hindsight bias), so it is 
unlikely that courts would be willing to recognize the patient’s 
motivation as a factor in adjudicating malpractice cases. 
                                                     
252. See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-
Patient Relationship, 267 JAMA 2221 (1992); Moulton & King, supra note 26; Quill and Brody, 
supra note 19. 
253. In Poag v. Atkins and Schneider v. Revici, for example, the patients sought out Drs. Atkins 
and Revici after hearing them speak on radio programs about the benefits of alternative treatment. 
Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 989 (2d Cir. 1987); Poag v. Atkins, 806 N.Y.S.2d 448, 2005 WL 
2219689, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 12, 2005) (unpublished table decision). In Charell, the patient 
pursued alternative treatment with Dr. Gonzales, whom she knew about through his tapes and 
lectures, because she had “witnessed the severe discomfort experienced by a relative who had 
undertaken chemotherapy and radiation.” Charell v. Gonzalez, 660 N.Y.S.2d 665, 666 (Sup. Ct. 
1997). 
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A more practical way of addressing issues of physician influence is to 
consider whether the physician had any clear conflicts of interest in 
making a treatment recommendation (besides the obvious financial 
benefit inherent in providing medical treatment in exchange for 
payment). There is precedent suggesting that physicians have a legal 
obligation to disclose financial conflicts of interest that may influence 
their treatment decisions. In Moore v. Regents, University of 
California,254 a case in which a physician provided unnecessary medical 
services to a patient without disclosing his own financial incentives in 
commercial development of a cell line from the patient’s blood, the 
California Supreme Court held that “a physician who is seeking a 
patient’s consent for a medical procedure must, in order to satisfy his 
fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient’s informed consent, disclose 
personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research or 
economic, that may affect his medical judgment.”255 In a number of 
malpractice cases against physicians whose medical recommendations 
were influenced by HMO financial incentives, courts also recognized 
that a physician’s failure to disclose financial incentives might constitute 
a breach of duty.256 
Thus, one additional mechanism for patient protection would be to 
allow physicians to rely on these defenses only if they have disclosed to 
the patient any personal conflicts of interest that might affect their 
treatment recommendations. As noted above, this is already a 
requirement for the satisfaction of the physician’s informed consent 
duties under common law. Thus, this recommendation would follow 
neatly from the recommendation presented above that physicians’ use of 
these defenses be conditioned on the satisfaction of their common law 
duty to obtain a patient’s informed consent.257 
Patient advocates, however, might argue that disclosure of conflicts of 
interest is insufficient to protect patients from undue physician influence. 
                                                     
254. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
255. Id. at 485. 
256. Shea v. Eisensten, 208 F.3d 712, 717 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a jury could find 
physicians liable for negligent misrepresentation for failing to disclose a financial incentive to avoid 
referrals, where this failure to disclose prevented the plaintiff “from making an informed choice of 
whether to seek what might have been a life-saving referral at his own expense”); Neade v. Portes, 
739 N.E.2d. 496, 502–03 (Ill. 2000) (finding that a fiduciary duty claim for failure to disclose 
financial incentives was duplicative of the medical malpractice claim); DAB v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 
168, 171 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a physician’s failure to disclose a kickback scheme 
“presents a classic informed consent issue”); see generally Nadia N. Sawicki, Modernizing 
Informed Consent, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 842. 
257. See supra section IV.A.1. 
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Rather, perhaps physicians with financial conflicts of interest ought to be 
barred entirely from reliance on assumption of risk and waiver defenses, 
even if their conflicts have been disclosed. I believe that this approach, 
however, goes one step too far. As explained above,258 so long as we are 
willing to allow patients to choose treatment options in which their 
physicians have financial interests, there is no reason to permit those 
patients, under ordinary circumstances, to seek legal recovery for the 
consequences of their informed and voluntary decisions. 
3. Disclosure of Deviations from the Standard of Care 
While the requirement that physicians fully inform their patients 
about the risks and benefits of a selected treatment and its alternatives 
would be sufficient to satisfy legal standards of informed consent, it may 
overlook other ways in which patients’ decisions might not be fully 
informed or autonomous. Imagine, for example, a patient who chooses 
to accept a treatment with a 10% chance of success without knowing that 
the treatment falls outside the standard of care (and therefore, that the 
physician’s provision of this treatment constitutes malpractice). In such a 
case, the patient might allege that had she known the treatment was 
outside the standard of care, she would not have pursued it. In other 
words, she would only have been willing to accept a treatment with a 
10% chance of success had she known that the treatment was within the 
professional standard of care. 
However, it is by no means clear that a traditional informed consent 
claim on these grounds—where the claim rests on a lack of disclosure as 
to whether the proposed treatment is within the standard of care—would 
be successful. While there is no case law on this precise issue, courts in 
other contexts have held that a regulatory body’s approval of a treatment 
is not a “material risk” that must be disclosed under the common law of 
informed consent.259 Numerous cases dealing with off-label use of drugs 
                                                     
258. Id. 
259. In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 1014, 1996 WL 107556, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 8, 1996) (holding that a physician cannot be liable under informed consent “for failing to 
advise a patient that a particular device has been given an administrative or regulatory label by the 
FDA”); see also, e.g., Alvarez v. Smith, 714 So. 2d 652, 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that 
the FDA status of metal screws used in plaintiff’s spinal surgery was not a “medical risk” that must 
be disclosed as part of informed consent); Blazoski v. Cook, 787 A.2d 910, 919 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2002) (holding that because FDA regulatory status “do[es] not speak directly to the 
medical issues surrounding a particular surgery” it need not be disclosed as part of informed 
consent); Klein v. Biscup, 673 N.E.2d 225, 231 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (holding that “off-label use of 
a medical device is not a material risk” that must be disclosed as part of the informed consent 
process); Southard v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 781 A.2d 101, 107 (Pa. 2001) (holding that because 
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and devices—that is, the use of FDA-approved drugs and devices for a 
purpose outside the scope of the FDA’s approval—have concluded that 
physicians have no duty to disclose to patients that the treatments they 
are providing are not FDA-approved for a particular purpose.260 That 
said, many off-label uses are, in fact, within the standard of care. In 
contrast, use of a drug or device that has not been approved by the FDA 
as safe and effective for any purpose—which likely would constitute 
malpractice outside the context of clinical research—could potentially be 
viewed as material to a patient’s treatment decision and therefore within 
the scope of informed consent. 
But even if a treatment’s deviation from the standard of care is not 
within the traditional scope of informed consent disclosure, there is an 
argument to be made that a physician’s reliance on assumption of risk as 
a defense—which requires a plaintiff’s voluntary choice to encounter a 
known risk—requires proof that the plaintiff knew the physician would 
be deviating from the standard of care. 
Unfortunately, the assumption of risk jurisprudence regarding this 
issue is unclear. Secondary assumption of risk requires a showing that 
the plaintiff voluntarily encountered a known risk of the defendant’s 
negligence. But there is no doctrinal guidance as to whether the 
knowledge requirement is satisfied when the plaintiff is aware of the 
risks of proceeding with an activity (i.e., a particular type of physical 
injury), or whether it requires the more specific knowledge that these 
risks exist only as a result of a breach of duty by the defendant. 
Nevertheless, a hypothetical should demonstrate that knowledge of a 
defendant’s breach cannot be a legal requirement for secondary implied 
assumption of risk, as long as the plaintiff is aware of the specific risks 
                                                     
FDA labeling “does not constitute a material fact, risk, complication or alternative to a surgical 
procedure,” it need not be disclosed as part of the informed consent process). But see Corrigan v. 
Methodist Hosp., 869 F. Supp. 1202, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that allegations that a doctor 
failed to disclose the “investigational” status of bone screws used in plaintiff’s surgery raised a 
triable issue of fact as to informed consent); Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp., 874 F. Supp. 657, 659 
(E.D. Pa. 1995) (same). See also James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and 
Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71 (1998) 
(collecting cases on this issue and concluding that “[b]ecause FDA regulatory status of medical 
devices and drugs is irrelevant to the nature, risks, benefits, or alternatives of medical procedures, 
there is and should be no legal or ethical obligation for physicians to discuss FDA regulatory status 
issues with their patients”). 
260. See supra note 259. However, some commentators disagree with this outcome. One article 
notes that “[t]he view that off-label status is not material to a patient’s decision to accept a particular 
course of treatment is rationalized on the wobbly ground that off-label status is a regulatory fact, not 
a medical fact, and thus that it does ‘not speak directly to the medical issues surrounding a particular 
[use].’” Philip M. Rosoff & Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Case for Legal Regulation of 
Physicians’ Off-Label Prescribing, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 672 (2011). 
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he is encountering. Imagine, for example, a skier who encounters a trail 
that is not smoothed or well-packed, and is covered with large chunks of 
ice. The skier should understand that skiing down this dangerous trail 
poses additional risks beyond the inherent risks in skiing a well-
maintained trail, and so can be said to have assumed these additional 
risks if he chooses to proceed. However, the skier may not know 
whether the condition of the trail is due to the trail operator’s negligence. 
For example, the trail’s condition may be the result of an avalanche that 
occurred seconds ago; if no reasonable facility operator would have been 
able to correct the condition or provide a warning in that brief time, then 
the skier would not be able to recover because there was no breach of 
duty (“primary assumption of risk”). But if, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, 
the condition of the trail was due to negligent maintenance by the facility 
operator, it would seem odd to bar the use of secondary assumption of 
risk as a defense simply because the plaintiff did not know that the 
additional risks she was encountering were the result of a breach of duty. 
A dangerous trail is dangerous regardless of whether the danger was 
caused by natural and unavoidable conditions or by a defendant’s 
negligence. Holding that a plaintiff should be able to recover in full 
when the plaintiff encounters a danger without knowing it was caused by 
a defendant’s negligence—despite the plaintiff’s knowledge, awareness, 
and voluntary acceptance of the dangerous condition itself—seems 
inconsistent with the principles underlying the doctrine of assumption of 
risk. 
Applying this reasoning to the medical context, there seems to be no 
doctrinal reason to bar the use of implied or express assumption of risk 
as a defense when a patient chooses to proceed with a treatment with the 
understanding that it poses specific risks, simply on the grounds that the 
patient did not know that the physician’s provision of that treatment was 
itself a breach of duty. 
But as with the informed consent requirements discussed in section 
IV.A.1, the fact that the tort doctrine of assumption of risk does not 
require specific knowledge of a defendant’s breach may have troubling 
implications in the context of medical treatment. As noted above, pure 
applications of contract and tort law do not account for the fiduciary 
aspects of the doctor-patient relationship, and there are policy reasons 
why we might impose additional requirements on physicians claiming 
these defenses—as compared to widget manufacturers, for example. The 
arguments for imposing a requirement that physicians disclose their 
deviations from the standard of care would be similar to those for 
imposing such a disclosure duty under informed consent law—that 
patients, more so than plaintiffs in non-medical contexts, are at an 
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informational disadvantage as compared to defendant physicians. The 
common law of informed consent (requiring disclosure of the risks and 
benefits of various treatment options that would be material to a 
patient’s decision) developed in order to correct this informational 
imbalance. But surely a patient cannot make a fully informed and 
voluntary decision about whether to proceed with a risky treatment if she 
does not know that the treatment falls outside the standard of care and 
has been rejected by the medical community. 
Thus, although common law may not currently require that physicians 
disclose deviations from the standard of care (whether to satisfy their 
informed consent duties or benefit from assumption of risk-based 
defenses), there are strong policy arguments for requiring such 
disclosure. The expansion of assumption of risk and contractual waiver 
defenses to a broader set of medical contexts should be tied to additional 
patient protections—here, a requirement that physicians who wish to 
protect themselves from liability when their patients choose medical 
malpractice must first disclose that the chosen treatment is a deviation 
from the standard of care. 
B. Ensuring Responsible Medical Practice 
Proponents of the traditional patient-protective view will argue 
against expanding recognition of assumption of risk defenses beyond 
alternative treatment and Jehovah’s Witness cases to other instances of 
unorthodox patient-directed care. Once patients are no longer permitted 
to sue for injuries resulting from treatment that the medical and legal 
communities consider to be outside the standard of care, critics will 
argue, the deterrent effects of tort law disappear.261 Physicians will have 
no incentive to practice according to medical norms, and patients will be 
increasingly exposed to treatment methods that pose significant risks of 
harm. Such an outcome would effectively render the medical and legal 
concepts of “standard of care” obsolete. 
It is true that limiting malpractice liability for physicians who choose 
to offer patients non-standard treatments will remove an important 
disincentive to negligent medical practice. However, these effects will 
be limited to the intentional provision of treatment outside of the 
standard of care with a patient’s voluntary and informed consent. This 
establishes a very clear dividing line and will not impact patients’ right 
                                                     
261. See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 90, at 257 (arguing against contractual limitations on patients’ 
right to sue for medical malpractice, on the grounds that the use of such contracts would defeat the 
individual and systemic deterrent effects of tort law). 
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to tort recovery for the kind of unanticipated negligence that forms the 
basis of many medical malpractice actions, which by its very nature 
patients cannot knowingly accept. 
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that while malpractice 
liability incentivizes quality of care at both the individual and systemic 
level,262 a fundamental and unique goal of tort law is to allow victims of 
civil wrongs to obtain recourse against those who have caused their 
injuries.263 And there is no inconsistency in holding that a patient should 
not receive compensation for injuries from a non-standard treatment he 
knowingly and voluntarily consented to, while also holding that a 
physician who provides such treatment is violating the norms of the 
medical profession (and therefore would be considered to have breached 
a duty had his patient not accepted the risks of treatment). Tort law, of 
course, is also driven by the desire to incentivize good behavior and 
deter people from taking unreasonable risks that impact third parties. 
However, this goal is not unique to the tort system—it is shared by 
criminal law, administrative law, and various other societal levers for 
controlling behavior. Thus, because there are many other legal and 
practical mechanisms beyond the bounds of tort law that serve to 
reinforce standards of care and incentivize physicians to practice within 
those standards, limiting patients’ ability to recover in tort when they 
choose medical malpractice is unlikely to increase the market in “bad 
medicine.” 
1. State Licensure and Discipline 
The most valuable legal mechanisms in this regard are state medical 
licensure and discipline laws, which establish the requirements for 
obtaining and retaining a medical license, and authorize state medical 
boards to discipline physicians whose practices falls too far outside the 
medical mainstream. Indeed, Dr. Emanuel Revici, the defendant in 
Schneider v. Revici264 and Boyle v. Revici, 265 lost his medical license as a 
result of his treatment of cancer patients with alternative therapies.266 
                                                     
262. Id. (discussing systemic incentives provided by tort law in malpractice cases). 
263. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTION TO U.S. 
LAW: TORTS 6 (2010) (“Tort law empowers victims to obtain recourse against those who have 
wronged them.”). 
264. 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1987). 
265. 961 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1992). 
266. Revici v. Comm’r of Educ., 546 N.Y.S.2d 240 (App. Div. 1989) (upholding Commissioner 
of Education’s disciplinary action against Dr. Revici for treating breast cancer patients with vinegar, 
baking soda, soft boiled eggs, and coffee); Emanuel Revici, M.D., Arb. 93-128, 1993 WL 13670584 
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Countless examples have been reported in the media of disciplinary 
actions against “maverick” physicians providing unorthodox treatments 
sought out by patients skeptical of traditional medical practices, 
including treatment of “chronic” Lyme disease with long-term antibiotic 
therapy,267 delaying or denying routine pediatric vaccinations,268 stem 
cell treatments for both anti-aging purposes and treatment of serious 
disorders,269 treatment of autistic children with chelation therapy and 
chemical castration,270 in vitro implantation of multiple embryos,271 
                                                     
(N.Y. Dep’t of Health Bd. for Prof. Med. Conduct Jan.1, 1993) (sustaining Hearing Committee’s 
Determination revoking Dr. Revici’s license to practice medicine in New York State). 
267. Holcomb B. Noble, Lyme Doctors Rally Behind a Colleague Under Inquiry,  N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 10, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/10/us/lyme-doctors-rally-behind-a-colleague-
under-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/XF49-EGHA] (discussing controversy surrounding board 
discipline of physicians treating Lyme disease); David Whelan, Lyme Inc., FORBES (Feb. 23, 2007), 
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2007/0312/096.html [https://perma.cc/863M-7WNL] (describing 
medical board action against “Lyme Literate” physician Dr. Joseph Jemsek). 
268. Arthur L. Caplan, Revoke the License of Any Doctor Who Opposes Vaccination, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/revoke-the-license-of-any-doctor-
who-opposes-vaccination/2015/02/06/11a05e50-ad7f-11e4-9c91-e9d2f9fde644_story.html?utm_t 
erm=.63250c5dff31 [https://perma.cc/JJ2A-3FB6] (arguing that doctors who oppose vaccination 
should have their medical licenses revoked, and that state licensing boards have the authority to do 
so); Matt Hamilton, Dr. Bob Sears, Critic of Vaccine Laws, Could Lose License After Exempting 
Toddler, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016, 10:20 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-oc-
vaccine-doctor-20160908-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/87JA-FDQS] (describing disciplinary 
action against physician for “improperly excusing a toddler from immunization” on the basis of a 
parent’s description of the child’s response to previous vaccinations).  
269. Alan Zarembo, Doctor with Revoked License Continues to Sell Unproven Stem Cell 
Treatments, L.A. TIMES (May 16, 2015, 5:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-
stem-cell-injections-20150517-story.html [https://perma.cc/PV3H-E75U] (describing disciplinary 
action against physician who used stem cell injections to treat patients with arthritis, muscular 
dystrophy, spinal cord injuries and other conditions). 
270. Deborah Shelton, Dr. Mark Geier Loses License in Illinois, Missouri, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 5, 
2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-11-05/news/ct-met-autism-doctor-20121106_1_ 
autism-doctor-david-geier-mark-geier [https://perma.cc/S4GU-PYV6] (describing disciplinary 
action against physician using “dubious treatments” for autism); Trine Tsouderos & Patricia 
Callahan, Risky Alternative Therapies for Autism Have Little Basis in Science, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 22, 
2009), http://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/health/chi-autism-treatments-nov22-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/T8GB-CFAX] (describing complaints to state medical boards filed by parents of 
children with autism who received “alternative” therapies). 
271. Shaya Tayefe Mohajer, State Medical Board Revokes Octomom Doc’s License, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB. (June 2, 2011, 1:58 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-state-medical-
board-revokes-octomom-docs-license-2011jun02-story.html [https://perma.cc/N664-78LN] 
(describing Medical Board of California’s decision to revoke license of physician who implanted 
twelve embryos in Nadya Suleman, the “Octomom”); Shaya Tayefe Mohajer, FDA Witness: 
Octomom Doc Used Experimental Methods, 89.3KPCC (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.scpr.org/news/ 
2010/11/18/21094/fda-witness-octomom-doc-used-experimental-methods/ [https://perma.cc/QGW3 
-9YKP] (describing evidence in state medical board hearing for Nadya Suleman’s physician, 
including evidence that Dr. Kamrava went “out of his way to warn Suleman of the risks of 
implanting all 12 embryos,” and “clearly spelled out over and over and over again that . . . he 
 
Sawicki – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  9:48 PM 
2018] CHOOSING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 961 
 
unnecessary tests and inappropriate prescribing,272 recommendation of 
medical marijuana,273 and aid in dying for non-terminal patients.274 
While some physicians who engage in these non-standard practices view 
board discipline as a badge of honor reflecting their status as 
innovators,275 the threat of suspension or complete revocation of one’s 
medical license for practicing outside the standard of care surely has a 
deterrent effect even greater than that of tort liability. 
2. Insurance Reimbursement 
A second mechanism that can be relied upon to address concerns 
about quality of care is that of insurance reimbursement. Even if the 
threat of tort liability for unorthodox treatments is gone, physicians will 
not provide these treatments if they know they will not be compensated 
for their services. Both governmental and private insurers already use 
financial levers to drive medical practice—from utilization review of 
high-cost procedures276 to coverage refusals for specific conditions and 
                                                     
disagreed with her decision, and that she understands everything, that she’s insisting he transfer all 
the embryos”). 
272. Tara Bannow, Redmond Physician Could Lose Her License, BEND BULL. (May 30, 2015, 
12:04 AM), http://www.bendbulletin.com/newsroomstafflist/3203851-151/redmond-physician-
could-lose-her-license [https://perma.cc/R9ZC-TSCZ] (discussing board investigation of a 
physician for a “‘pattern’ of unnecessary tests, treatments that were not medically indicated and 
prescribing excessive amounts of antibiotic and opioid medications”).  
273. Felice J. Freyer & Kay Lazar, Medical Marijuana Doctor Loses License to Practice, BOS. 
GLOBE (June 3, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/06/03/medical-marijuana-doctors-
loses-license-practice/L5jRBrby55bFWb8p8AwB6I/story.html [https://perma.cc/M8AP-K2R6] 
(describing medical board’s revocation of licenses of two physicians for “improperly certifying that 
thousands of patients were eligible to receive medical marijuana”); John Ingold, Four Colorado 
Doctors Suspended over Medical Marijuana Recommendations, DENVER POST (July 19, 2016), 
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/07/19/four-colorado-doctors-suspended-over-medical-marijuana-
recommendations/ [https://perma.cc/R9Y4-BWLU] (describing medical board’s revocation of 
licenses of four physicians for recommending “excessive plant counts to more than 1,500 patients”). 
274. Alan Blinder, Doctor Loses License over Assisted Suicides, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/us/doctor-loses-license-over-assisted-suicides.html?_r=0 (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2018) (describing physician whose medical license was revoked for attending the 
suicides of six people “suffering from intolerable medical circumstances”). 
275. As one physician, who spoke with pride of losing his license for treating patients with 
unproven stem cell injections, said to a reporter, “I must be doing something right . . . . The greater 
percentage of people who get into trouble are ahead of their time.” Zarembo, supra note 269. 
276. See Howard L. Bailit & Cary Sennett, Utilization Management as a Cost-Containment 
Strategy, 1991 SUPP. HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 87 (1992); Kanika Kapur, Carole Roan 
Gresenz & David M. Studdert, Managing Care: Utilization Review in Action at Two Capitated 
Medical Groups, HEALTH AFFAIRS (2003). 
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treatments.277 When insurers deny coverage for non-standard treatments, 
those treatments will end up being available only to patients who are 
able to provide their own funding. And unless there are a substantial 
number of patients both clamoring for an unconventional treatment and 
willing to pay for it out of pocket, the likelihood that physicians will 
continue to provide these services is low. With respect to governmental 
payors, moreover, the exclusionary power of Medicare and Medicaid 
pursuant to federal Conditions of Participation—frequently described as 
a “death sentence” for health care providers—can be used against 
physicians who do not satisfy professionally recognized standards of 
care.278 
3. Institutional Standards and Hospital Credentialing 
Health care institutions can also use their powers to define the 
boundaries of appropriate medical practice. Medical providers who work 
as employees or contractors within hospitals, nursing homes, and other 
facilities are bound by institutional policies and staff bylaws. These, 
along with peer review, can be used as mechanisms for limiting 
physicians’ authority to operate outside the standard of care. In the case 
of the Scottish physician who amputated the healthy limbs of patients 
with apotemnophilia, for example, the hospital at which he performed 
the surgeries ultimately “announced a ban on further amputations after a 
report of the hospital’s ethics committee.”279 
With consolidation in the health care industry at an all-time high, and 
the trend towards pay-for-performance incentivizing institutional 
management of quality and risk, health care organizations now have 
even more tools to define (and enforce) standards of practice among 
their providers. 
                                                     
277. For example, cosmetic surgery, infertility treatments, weight loss surgery, home birth, 
experimental treatments, and alternative and complementary therapies are among the services that 
many health insurance policies exclude from coverage. See, e.g., Limitations and Exclusions of 
Aetna Health Insurance Plans, AETNA, https://www.aetna.com/plan-info/individual/legal/ 
limitations-exclusions.html [https://perma.cc/883T-FA4R] (identifying such exclusions in Aetna 
health insurance plans). 
278. See generally Exclusions Authorities, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/exclusions/authorities.asp [https://perma.cc/C5JT-
ZMNS]. 
279. Sabine Muller, Body Identity Integrity Disorder (BIID): Is the Amputation of Healthy Limbs 
Ethically Justified?, 9 AM. J. BIOETHICS 36, 36 (2009). 
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4. Legislative Prohibitions 
Finally, if the medical and legal communities believe that a given 
approach to treatment is so extreme that it is unavoidably harmful, 
fundamentally inconsistent with professional norms, and lacks any 
societal value, state legislators could enact laws banning the treatment. 
State laws prohibiting the use of sexual orientation conversion therapy 
on minors are one example of legislative intervention aimed at 
protecting patients from a treatment that has been generally rejected by 
the medical community.280 Laws criminalizing assistance in suicide, 
while not aimed at health care professionals specifically, serve a similar 
purpose.281 That said, legislative intervention is a less preferable solution 
than medical board discipline, financial disincentives, or institutional 
enforcement of standards of care, as such laws are frequently driven by 
political motivations rather than scientific evidence or medical norms.282 
In sum, there are many ways in which the medical profession can 
signal to physicians what constitutes appropriate medical practice, and 
there are many legal and institutional deterrents to inappropriate 
practice. Limiting patients’ right to tort recovery when they provide 
voluntary and informed consent to treatment that intentionally falls 
outside the standard of care is not likely to dramatically lower the bar of 
physician practice. Today, outlier physicians providing treatments 
widely rejected by the medical and scientific communities do so despite 
public censure, license revocation, tort litigation, and even criminal 
charges. They do so in spite of these significant risks because patients, 
disillusioned with traditional medical practice, continue to seek them 
out. Clearly, these physicians are not deterred by the threat of 
malpractice liability, and elimination of that single deterrent is not likely 
to change their practice patterns. 
                                                     
280. See Haldeman, supra note 66, at 117; Shidlo & Schroeder, supra note 66, at 249. 
281. See, e.g., Final Exit Network, Inc. v. State, 722 S.E.2d 722 (Ga. 2012) (holding GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-5-5(b) (1994) to be an unconstitutional restriction of speech); State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 
844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014) (holding the State could prosecute an individual for assisting another 
in committing suicide, but not for encouraging or advising another to commit suicide); State v. Final 
Exit Network, Inc., 889 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (upholding statutory prohibition on 
assisting suicide). 
282. Laws restricting access to abortion are a good example. While the medical community 
accepts late-term abortions and partial-birth abortions as being within the standard of care and 
sometimes a matter of medical necessity, legislatures have overridden the opinions of medical 
experts on the basis of dubious evidence. See Margo Kaplan, A Special Class of Persons: Pregnant 
Women’s Right to Refuse Medical Treatment After Gonzales v. Carhart, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 145, 
158 (2011) (discussing “flimsy” evidentiary grounds for legislative finding that partial birth 
abortion is never medically necessary). 
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In contrast, some physicians may be limiting their use of innovative 
treatments that are safe and effective, but not yet widely accepted by the 
profession, simply because they fear being sued by litigious patients who 
don’t achieve the results they hope for. The practice of defensive 
medicine has been widely documented,283 and it can encompass not just 
providing unnecessary tests and treatments, but also not providing 
treatments that a jury might find do not comport with professional 
custom. Malpractice law’s reliance on custom to define the standard of 
care means that highly beneficial advances in medicine—including those 
that have greater evidentiary support than standard practices—tend to be 
adopted more slowly than they should be.284 If physicians had the 
confidence that a patient’s informed agreement to pursue innovative 
treatment would free physicians from liability for proper performance of 
that treatment, perhaps much-needed medical innovations would be 
adopted sooner, rather than later, benefiting patients overall. Thus, if 
courts expanded the use of these defenses to other contexts, physicians 
would have the flexibility to modify their practice in accordance with the 
best evidence without fear of liability. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts’ willingness to accept defenses to medical malpractice 
grounded in a patient’s explicit or implicit assumption of risk in two 
narrow contexts—experimental and alternative treatments, and 
Jehovah’s Witness blood refusal—demonstrates that the traditional 
                                                     
283. See Daniel Kessler & Mark McLellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, 111 Q. J. 
ECON. 353 (1996) (finding that malpractice reforms that reduce the pressure of litigation also reduce 
medical expenditures without substantial effects on morbidity or mortality); David M. Studdert et 
al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice 
Environment, 293 JAMA 2609 (2005) (finding that 93% of surveyed physicians in high-risk 
specialties reported practicing defensive medicine, including using imaging technology when not 
medically necessary); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-H-602, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1994) (describing defensive medicine practices and their prevalence). 
284. See Ronen Avraham, Clinical Practice Guidelines: The Warped Incentives in the U.S. 
Healthcare System, 37 AM. J. L. MED. 7, 14–16 (2011) (arguing that the common law system of 
medical malpractice liability does not keep pace with developments in medical innovation); Michael 
D. Greenberg, Medical Malpractice and New Devices: Defining an Elusive Standard of Care, 19 
HEALTH MATRIX 423 (2009) (arguing that the liability risks associated with the use of new medical 
devices operate as a disincentive to quality improvement and technical innovation); Laakmann, 
supra note 8 (arguing that the risk of malpractice liability deters physicians from deviating from 
generally accepted medical practices in an attempt to improve patient care); Daniel Merenstein, 
Winners and Losers, 291 JAMA 15 (2004) (describing a lawsuit by a patient who claimed that his 
physician, who followed national guidelines regarding shared decision-making for PSA testing, 
violated the standard of care of PSA testing without patient discussion). 
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patient-protective view set forth in cases like Tunkl is not without 
exception. In some contexts, patients are permitted to waive their health 
care providers’ duty to exercise due care, even though patients are 
traditionally viewed as vulnerable in the face of providers’ superior 
knowledge and bargaining power. 
This Article demonstrates that courts would be similarly justified in 
accepting these defenses in other contexts where patients seek out 
treatment that satisfies their personal preferences, despite the fact that it 
potentially falls outside the standard of care. The precedent set in the 
experimental treatment and blood refusal cases could be extended to 
many cases of “malpractice by choice,” as long as the patient 
understands the risks and benefits of the selected treatment and its 
alternatives, the patient is ultimately injured by risks inherent in the 
treatment rather than by unanticipated negligence, and the legal 
factfinder views the treatment as offering some societal value. 
Effectively, a patient’s informed consent to unorthodox treatment would 
operate as a defense to a medical malpractice action. 
But, this Article cautions, there are risks in formalistically applying 
the doctrines of assumption of risk and contractual waiver of liability to 
the physician-patient encounter. Neither doctrine demands that a 
physician satisfy the disclosure obligations imposed by the common law 
of informed consent (including the duty to disclose his own conflicts of 
interest), nor that he disclose the fact that the treatment he is offering 
deviates from the medical profession’s standard of care. As a matter of 
policy, however, it makes sense to require physicians who wish to 
benefit from defenses based on a patient’s voluntary acceptance of risk 
to demonstrate that they have made these disclosures. The fiduciary 
nature of the physician-patient relationship demands these additional 
patient protections. 
Such an approach would benefit patients who believe that unorthodox 
treatment is more consistent with their values and preferences and 
pursue it with full knowledge of its comparative risks and benefits. It 
would likewise benefit physicians by protecting them from liability 
when they offer alternative treatments sought out by patients, so long as 
they satisfy their legal obligation to secure the patient’s informed 
consent and disclose the fact that they are operating outside the standard 
of care. It might facilitate beneficial innovation in the delivery of 
medical care that is otherwise stymied by malpractice liability rules that 
defer to customary standards and view patients as incapable of making 
informed decisions to pursue treatment that deviates from those 
standards. And it would certainly be more in line with modern views of 
patient autonomy in medical decision-making. If the common law of 
Sawicki – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  9:48 PM 
966 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:891 
 
informed consent is justified on the basis of patients’ ability to 
understand and thoughtfully consider the risks and benefits of various 
types of medical treatment, then binding them to the consequences of 
their decisions is a natural extension of that principle. 
